# NDT Round 6 – ASU RV vs. Boston College KM (Neg)

## 1NC

### 1

#### 1. CIR will pass now

Politico 3/27 (http://www.politico.com/politico44/2013/03/obama-renews-push-on-immigration-reform-160372.html)

President Obama sought to refocus the political conversation on immigration reform Wednesday in interviews with two Spanish-language networks that come after weeks of news cycles dominated by discussions of guns, sequestration and same-sex marriage.¶ In interviews with Telemundo and Univision conducted Wednesday at the White House, the president stayed firm on the immigration reform timeline he set earlier this year and voiced confidence in the bipartisan group of eight senators who are negotiating a bill.¶ “I think we’ve seen enormous progress over the last month and a half,” Obama said in an interview with Telemundo. “I think both sides, Democrats and Republicans, have been very serious about the negotiations. I’m actually very optimistic that when they return in early April … we’ll see a bill ready to move through the process.”¶ "We're seeing right now a good, bipartisan spirit. I want to encourage that," he added on Univision. "Hopefully we'll be able to get it done."

#### 2. Obama’s capital is key to holding the coalition together

Bloomberg 3/22 (Guest-Worker Visas Sticking Point on Immigration Rewrite, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-21/guest-worker-visas-sticking-point-on-immigration-rewrite.html)

With Senate Republicans and Democrats moving closer to an agreement to grant a chance at U.S. citizenship to 11 million undocumented immigrants, a long- simmering dispute between organized labor and the business lobby risks sapping momentum for the measure.¶ The two constituencies are at odds over a new program to provide U.S. work visas to low-skilled foreign workers, placing pressure on lawmakers poised for a compromise. Unions are pressing for a limited visa system that guarantees better wages for future immigrant workers, while businesses seek a broader program more responsive to their hiring needs.¶ It’s the tougher side of what is otherwise a broadening consensus in both parties around an immigration plan, whose centerpiece is a path to U.S. citizenship for undocumented immigrants. A bipartisan group of eight senators is nearing a deal to bolster border security and workplace verification while revamping the legal immigration system.¶ Republican Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, a member of the group, called the guest-worker issue “one of the more difficult parts” of the negotiations.¶ “I’m not going to be part of a bill that doesn’t create a process whereby people can come to this country temporarily in the future if we need them,” Rubio said yesterday. “There’s no secret that the broader labor movement, with some exceptions, would rather not even have an immigration bill.”¶ Political Consequences¶ The disagreement carries significant political consequences for Republicans and Democrats alike, essentially making them choose between their strongest constituencies -- organized labor for Democrats and big business for Republicans -- and achievement of an overriding policy goal that both parties increasingly see as an electoral imperative.¶ Hispanics accounted for 10 percent of voters in the 2012 presidential election. President Barack Obama won 71 percent of their votes, and just 27 percent backed Republican nominee Mitt Romney, who had proposed “self-deportation” for undocumented immigrants. Since then, a growing chorus of Republicans has publicly backed legal status for undocumented immigrants.¶ Meanwhile, a group of Republican officials who unveiled a top-to-bottom review this week called for the party to back “comprehensive immigration reform” or see its appeal shrink.¶ “It is in neither party’s interest for one group within a party to stop this, because it is bad for the economy if we don’t have immigration reform,” former Mississippi Governor and Republican National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour said this week, referring to labor unions’ objections to a guest-worker program.¶ Worker Program¶ Former Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, a Democrat co- chairing an immigration task force with Barbour at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, said it is ultimately up to Obama to persuade Democrats not to abandon the bill if the immigrant-worker program doen’t match the unions’ agenda.¶ “If we don’t get guest-worker provisions that are exactly in line with what labor wants, we can’t hold up the bill because of that,” Rendell said. “We’ve got to do the best we can to preserve and protect the interests of organized labor, but in the end you can’t always get what you want.”¶ The president, he added, has “his work cut out for him.”¶ The bipartisan plan, expected to be unveiled early next month following a two-week congressional break, also faces a potentially rough road in the Senate and uncertain fate in the House, where Republican opposition to granting citizenship to undocumented immigrants is more prevalent.¶

#### 3. Exports unpopular – almost every constituency

Levi, ’12 (David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Director of the CFR program on energy security and climate change (Michael Levi, The Hamilton Project, June 2012, “A Strategy for US Natural Gas Exports,” [http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads\_and\_links/06\_exports\_levi.pdf)](http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/06_exports_levi.pdf%29//CC)

A revolution in U.S. natural gas production has forced policymakers to decide whether they should allow exports of LNG from the United States. They should say yes, within prudent limits, and leverage U.S. exports for broader gain. Yet the mere fact that the benefits of allowing exports would outweigh the costs does not mean that the political fight over allowing LNG exports will be tame. Operators of natural gas power plants will likely oppose exports, as will energy intensive manufacturers, though chemicals producers, if they are sufficiently enlightened, may take a more moderate stance. Most environmental advocates who are concerned with the local impacts of shale gas development will likely join in opposition, as will those who are convinced that gas should be trapped for use in cars and trucks, and those who believe that any rise in consumer energy prices is unacceptable. The most prominent proponents of exports will likely be oil and gas companies and advocates of liberal trade, perhaps along with a broader group of foreign policy strategists that finds the prospect of disrupting relations between gas-producing and gas-consuming countries appealing, as well as supporters of renewable power who see cheap natural gas as competition (Schrag 2012). Any decision on LNG exports is likely to be controversial. Enlightened leadership and a strategy that mitigates downsides for poorer consumers and the local environment are essential to a smart strategy for constructively moving exports forward.

#### 4. Immigration reform key to US lead on biotech innovation

Scullion ’13 (Christine, “Manufacturers Take the Lead In STEM Education”, January 8, <http://www.shopfloor.org/2013/01/manufacturers-take-the-lead-in-stem-education/27254>, CMR)

The U.S. the leading producer of cutting-edge products such as those on display at the Consumer Electronics Show. Whether it’s in IT, biotech, aerospace, medical devices or heavy machinery, US companies will be the ones to constantly and consistently create new and better things. This future promises to be bright, but only if we have the workforce capable of pushing that leading-edge. And right now, that doesn’t look like a very good bet. The lack of a skilled workforce is a constant threat to manufacturing growth. In fact in a recent survey 82% of manufacturers reported a moderate-to-serious shortage in skilled production labor. Worker shortages abound not only among machinists and welders but also in occupations requiring expertise in the fields of science, technology, engineering and math (STEM), where the unemployment rate today lies well below 4%.¶ The US needs to refocus our workforce training resources and reform our immigration system to continue to grow and innovate. Immigration reform is a serious issue for Manufacturers not only in the High-tech arena but across manufacturing sectors. Without a skilled workforce – from the PhDs to production labor, the nation’s economy will suffer and jobs will be moved overseas. Access to the right individual with the right skills at the right time will ensure that the US remains a global innovation leader.

#### 5. Biotech innovation key to solve bioterror

Chyba & Greninger, 4 - Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford Institute for International Studies, and an Associate Professor at Stanford University

[Christopher & Alex, “Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World” Survival, 46:2, Summer 2004]

In the absence of a comprehensive and effective system of global review of potential high-consequence research, we are instead trapped in a kind of offence–defence arms race. Even as legitimate biomedical researchers develop defences against biological pathogens, bad actors could in turn engineer countermeasures in a kind of directed version of the way natural pathogens evolve resistance to anti-microbial drugs. The mousepox case provides a harbinger of what is to come: just as the United States was stockpiling 300m doses of smallpox vaccine as a defence against a terrorist smallpox attack, experimental modification of the mousepox virus showed how the vaccine could possibly be circumvented. The United States is now funding research on antiviral drugs and other ways of combating smallpox that might be effective against the engineered organism. Yet there are indications that smallpox can be made resistant to one of the few known antiviral drugs. **The future has the appearance of an** eternal arms race of measures and countermeasures. The ‘arms race’ metaphor should be used with caution; it too is in danger of calling up misleading analogies to the nuclear arms race of the Cold War. First, the biological arms race is an offence–defence race, rather than a competition between offensive means. Under the BWC, only defensive research is legitimate. But more fundamentally, the driver of de facto offensive capabilities in this arms race is not primarily a particular adversary, but rather the ongoing global advance of microbiological and biomedical research. Defensive measures **are in** a race with nefarious applications of basic research, much of which is itself undertaken for protection against natural disease. In a sense, we are in an arms race with ourselves. It is hard to see how this arms race is stable – an offence granted comparable resources would seem to be necessarily favoured. As with ballistic missile defence, particular defensive measures may be defeated by offensive countermeasures. **In the biological case, implementing defensive measures will require** not only **research** but drug development and distribution plans. Offensive measures need not exercise this care, although fortunately they will likely face comparative resource constraints (especially if not associated with a state programme), and may find that some approaches (for example, to confer antibiotic resistance) have the simultaneous effect of inadvertently reducing a pathogen’s virulence. The defence must always guard against committing the fallacy of the last move, whereas the offence may embrace the view of the Irish Republican Army after it failed to assassinate the British cabinet in the 1984 Brighton bombing: ‘Today we were unlucky, but remember we have only to be lucky once – you will have to be lucky always’.40 At the very least, the defence will have to be vigilant and collectively smarter than the offence. **The only way for the defence to win** convincingly in the biological arms race **would** seem to **be to succeed in discovering and implementing** certain de facto last-move defences, at least on an organism-by-organism basis. Perhaps there are defences, or a web of defences, that will prove too difficult for any plausible non-state actor to engineer around. Whether **such defences** exist is unclear at this time, but their exploration **should be a long-term research goal of US biodefence** efforts. Progress might also have an important impact on international public health. One of the ‘Grand Challenges’ identified by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in its $200m initiative to improve global health calls for the discovery of drugs that minimise the emergence of drug resistance – a kind of ‘last move’ defence against the evolutionary countermeasures of natural microbes.41 **Should** a collection of such **defensive moves prove possible**, **bioterrorism might ultimately succumb to** a kind of globalised **dissuasion by denial**:42 non-state groups would calculate that they could not hope to achieve dramatic results through biological programmes and would choose to direct their efforts elsewhere.

#### 6. Extinction

Steinbruner 97 John D. Steinbruner, Brookings senior fellow and chair in international security, vice chair of the committee on international security and arms control of the National Academy of Sciences, Winter 1997, Foreign Policy, “Biological weapons: a plague upon all houses,” n109 p85(12), infotrac

Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

### 2

#### Current talks will prevent Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon, but momentum is fragile

Warrick and Rezaian 2-26 (Joby and Jason, Iran nuclear talks end on upbeat note, Washington Post, 26 February 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-nuclear-talks-end-on-upbeat-note/2013/02/26/c216dea4-80e4-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a\_story.html, da 3-12-13) PC

International talks on Iran’s nuclear future ended on unexpectedly upbeat note on Wednesday, with Iran agreeing to further negotiations and hailing a possible “turning point” in the years-long diplomatic effort to resolve the nuclear crisis.¶ Negotiators from Iran and six world powers emerged from two days of private talks with cautious expressions of optimism and a commitment to holding additional meetings in quick succession in the coming weeks.¶ But officials also acknowledged significant differences over steps Iran must take to allay Western fears that Iran is secretly seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.¶ Iran’s chief negotiator Saeed Jalili, speaking to reporters after the end of the two-day session in Almaty, Kazakhstan, said his government had not yet seen an acceptable proposal that balanced Western demands for nuclear cutbacks with Iran’s desire for an easing of sanctions. But he said the atmosphere had changed markedly since the last attempt at negotiations failed eight months ago in Moscow.¶ “Despite the behavior that they have shown over the past eight months, it was they who tried to get closer to our point of view,” Jalili said. “We see that as a positive step. If they are really changing their approach and if they are approaching the talks with a strategy to get closer to mutual cooperation, this could be a turning point.”¶ Jalili also cautioned that there remains “a long distance to the desirable point,” particularly on resolving controversies over Iran’s uranium-enrichment program.¶ Secretary of State John F. Kerry, in Europe on his first overseas visit since his confirmation, also expressed cautious optimism about the outcome in Almaty.¶ “The talks were useful, and we look to Iran to carefully review the credible confidence-building steps that the P5-plus-1 have put on the table,” Kerry told reporters accompanying him on a flight to Paris. He was referring to the six-nation negotiating bloc, which includes the United States, Britain, China, Germany, France and Russia.¶ “If Iran engages seriously — and we hope they will — then these talks could pave the way for negotiations that lead toward a longer-term and more comprehensive agreement,” Kerry said.¶ European Union officials who led the P5-plus-1 delegation confirmed that the talks had yielded an agreement to hold two meetings in the coming weeks: a technical-level consultation in March, followed by a formal round of talks on April 5, again in Almaty.¶ Negotiators from Iran and the six world powers began meeting on Tuesday, then decided to add an unscheduled second day of talks as diplomats weighed competing plans for addressing international anxieties over Iran’s rapid gains in nuclear technology.¶ The extension came after a day of private exchanges that one Western diplomat characterized as “useful.” The United States and five other powers started the talks with a new proposal calling on Iran to give up parts of its nuclear program in exchange for partial relief from economic sanctions.¶ Iranian diplomats met for three hours Tuesday with delegates from the P5-plus-1, then conferred separately with leaders of several European delegations before resuming the discussions Wednesday morning.¶ The nuclear talks began amid low expectations, with U.S. and European officials expressing hope for modest momentum that eventually could lead to a comprehensive deal.

#### LNG exports hurt energy diplomacy – require sustained diplomatic engagement, and cause credibility issues

Kirkland, E&E reporter, 12 (Joel, Natural gas cuts deeper path into U.S. goals abroad, E&E News, 13 August 2012, http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/08/13/1, da 1-31-13) PC

Whose oil goes where will continue to be a challenge for State, but Clinton's department sees natural gas as just as potent a geopolitical and economic weapon and is reframing global energy discussions around gas. Record production out of U.S. shale gas fields has driven down prices, resurrecting the petrochemical sector and replacing coal to cut emissions at power plants. The United States could outproduce Russia by 2017.¶ If U.S. drilling technology can help replicate the boom in other countries, say Pascual and outside observers of the Obama administration's policy, Russia and the oil and gas oligarchs in the Middle East will find it harder to dictate the terms of energy contracts and be outsize political forces.¶ "You need a permanent diplomatic presence to sustain a long-term policy," said David Goldwyn, a former State Department global energy affairs coordinator.¶ Goldwyn helped establish State's "global shale gas initiative." In 2010, that became the Unconventional Gas Technical Engagement Program. The administration calls it part climate policy. Burning natural gas produces half the carbon emissions of coal. In Europe, gas production has political aims. In China, U.S. assistance in Sichuan Basin shale gas fields or with coalbed methane projects is also commercial interest for U.S. companies.¶ Goldwyn credited Pascual with getting the office up and running quickly. Still, he said it is unclear the extent to which the State Department is actively promoting the penetration of domestic gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports to replace coal.¶ U.S.-based multinational oil companies Exxon Mobil Corp., Chevron Corp. and ConocoPhillips have stakes in multibillion-dollar LNG export projects in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. At least one LNG export terminal is expected to be built along the coast of Louisiana.¶ "We haven't figured out how we'll use LNG exports as a tool of diplomacy," Goldwyn said. "The administration is still a little bit conflicted on whether it wants to promote increased use of natural gas overseas while it's still pursuing a renewables agenda here."¶ The administration has appeared equally conflicted as domestic drilling became an issue at home. Since Obama has taken office, the oil and gas industry's rapid development of shale gas and tight oil formations outside major metropolitan areas has sparked an environmental backlash. Still, the White House is caught up in a slow economic recovery, and jobs and sectors are building up around North American oil and gas.

#### Kerry’s key to prevent Iranian nuclearization – maintains international cooperation for negotiations.

Raddatz et al. 3-5 (Martha Raddatz, Richard Coolidge & Jordyn Phelps, The new diplomat on the block: Kerry’s tough take on Syria and Iran, Yahoo! News, 5 March 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/power-players-abc-news/diplomat-block-kerry-tough-syria-iran-195118953.html, da 3-12-13) PC

At the end of his first overseas trip as secretary of state, John Kerry says the international community is facing a "challenging moment" in negotiating a peaceful solution with Iran over its nuclear program and says the United States, along with the other countries involved in aiding Syria’s opposition forces, has "ratcheted up support" to bring an end to the two-year long conflict.¶ The newly minted secretary of state says that while Iran has been allowed to cross red lines in the past, President Obama is determined to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.¶ "This is a very challenging moment with great risks and stakes for everybody because the region will be far less stable and far more threatened if Iran were to have a nuclear weapon," Kerry tells On the Radar. "It will spur a nuclear arms race. It has risks for greater terrorism. It will be destabilizing."¶ And while the stakes are high with Iran, Kerry says the level of cooperation among the international community has never been stronger.¶ "Right now you have the most significant cooperation in history between Israeli intelligence, American intelligence, other intelligence entities," Kerry says. "We are prepared through P5+1 and negotiating process to engage in a serious proposal that they would make to prove their program is in fact a peaceful program."

#### Iran prolif causes extinction even if it doesn’t use the weapon – causes nuclear conflict, Middle East proliferation, regional instability and terrorism.

Rubin 9 – (Barry, Prof @ the Interdisciplinary Center, Director of the Global Research in International Affairs, Research Director of the IDC's Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, “What if Iran gets a working nuclear weapon? How Middle East crisis would hit U.S.,” http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/iran-working-nuclear-weapon-middle-east-crisis-hit-u-s-article-1.369329, da 3-14-13) PC

If and when Iran gets nuclear weapons it would set off a global nightmare.

Most obviously, Iran could use nuclear arms to attack Israel. It’s easy to say that Iran’s leaders would be cautious, but what if ideology, error, or an extremist faction decides to wipe the Jewish state off the map? Even a 10-percent chance of nuclear holocaust is terrifying.¶ And if Israel decides its existence is at risk, it would launch a preemptive attack that would also produce a big crisis.¶ That’s just for starters.¶ Once Iran has nuclear weapons, every Arab state, with the exception of Iran’s ally Syria, would also be imperiled. Those countries would beg for U.S. protection. But could they depend on America, under the Barack Obama administration, to go to war – especially a nuclear one – to shield them?¶ Uncertain of U.S. reliability, these governments would rush to appease Iran.¶ To survive, the Arab states will do whatever Iran wants – which would come at high cost for America: alliances would weaken and military bases would close down. No Arab state would dare support peace with Israel, either.¶ But Arab states wouldn’t feel safe with just appeasement. An arms’ race would escalate in which several other countries would try to buy or build nukes of their own. Tension, and chance for nuclear war, whether through accident or miscalculation, would soar. The United States would eventually have to get dragged in.¶ European allies would also be scared. As reluctant as they are to help America in the Middle East, that paralysis would get worse. As willing as they are to appease Tehran, they’d go far beyond that.¶ Meanwhile, an emboldened Iran would push to limit oil and gas production and increase prices. Other oil producers would feel compelled to move away from their former, more responsible practices. Consumers’ fears would push up the prices further.¶ Yet there’s worse. Flush with a feel of victory, Iran and its allies — Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iraqi insurgents — would recruit more members to its cause. These terrorist groups would interpret the retreat of more moderate Arab countries and the West as signs of weakness and use it to fuel more aggression.¶ Indeed, all Islamists, even those hostile to Iran, would view its achievement as a great Islamic victory. Hundreds of thousands would join or become active supporters of radical Islamist groups throughout the Middle East, in Europe, and elsewhere. Fervent with a sense of divine favor and imminent victory, they’d escalate their operations. The result would be increased violence and possible civil war in every Arab state and far more terrorism in the West. ¶ Such a terrible scenario is likely even if Iran never actual uses a nuclear weapon on another country.¶ This new era in the Middle East would bring risks and the probability of war for America that would dwarf all the region’s current troubles and the crises faced by the United States in the whole world.¶ And that’s why it’s so important to avoid Iran getting nuclear weapons in the first place.

### 3

#### The United States Department of Energy (DOE) should approve Freeport LNG Expansion, Lake Charles Exports LLC, Cameron LNG liquefaction, Gulf LNG, Sabine Pass LNG, terminal, Golden Pass Products LLC, Gulf Coast LNG Export LLC, Excelerate floating terminal, Corpus Christi Liquefaction LLC, Main Pass Energy Hub LLC, Jordan Cove Energy Project LP, Dominion Cove Point, and Elba Island terminal for natural gas exports.

#### Currently pending applications for LNG export are the following

Paise 12 (John, John E. Paisie, JEA Consulting Group, Toledo, Ohio, US LNG EXPORT PROJECTS—1: Three-point system compares US LNG export projects, http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-12/transportation/us-lng-export-projects-1-three-point.html)

Fig. 1 shows proposed US LNG export terminals. One key obstacle facing these projects is the process companies must go through to obtain approval to build export terminals and export LNG.



1. Freeport LNG Expansion

2. Lake Charles Exports LLC

3. Cameron LNG liquefaction

4. Gulf LNG

5. Sabine Pass LNG terminal

6. Golden Pass Products LLC

7. Gulf Coast LNG Export LLC

8. Excelerate floating terminal

9. Corpus Christi Liquefaction LLC,

10. Main Pass Energy Hub LLC

11. Jordan Cove Energy Project LP

12. Oregon LNG

13. Dominion Cove Point

14. Elba Island terminal

A company must receive approval from the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to build an export terminal. FERC has exclusive authority to approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of onshore LNG terminals under the Natural Gas Act, as updated by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. FERC also monitors all construction and restoration to ensure compliance with federal, state, and local permits and regulations.¶ A company must first request FERC to undertake a prefiling environmental review. This process serves to prepare for compliance with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) in preparing the environmental impact statement (EIS) or environmental assessment (EA) and can take up to 1 year to complete.¶ After the prefiling review begins, a company must prepare resource reports to submit to FERC with its formal application in so FERC can prepare an EIS or EA. This process can also take more than 1 year.¶ The EIS lays out the impacts and alternatives of proposed action, in this case the decision to approve or deny an LNG export project. During preparation of the EIS and EA, FERC will work with cooperating state and federal agencies to assess the environmental consequences of the plant. If the agency finds the plant will significantly affect the quality of the human environment, it will address those consequences with suggested mitigation strategies.¶ The report will also assess alternatives to the plant being approved. Provided that an owner of an LNG export plant is willing to work with FERC in mitigating the environmental consequences of a plant, it is likely that completing an EIS or EA will be followed by approval of a project.¶ After FERC authorization is obtained, a potential LNG export project must acquire a number of other state and federal permits. These include dispensations under the Clean Water Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, and Clean Air Act, as well as federal endangered species clearance from the Fish and Wildlife Service. Each state also has several permits, often ranging up to 30, that a company must obtain before construction can begin.¶ Cheniere Energy Inc. successfully completed approval processes for export capacity at its Sabine Pass plant in Louisiana. Approvals included a water quality certificate from Louisiana, a permit from the US Corps of Army Engineers for working in wetlands, state endangered species clearance from the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, an air emissions permit from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, and a National Historic Preservation Act Clearance from the Louisiana Department of Culture.¶ These permits are similar to FERC approval in that they are not barriers to construction, provided the company complies with the guidelines necessary to obtain approval.¶ The permit currently restricting approval of all US LNG export terminals is the authorization-to-export permit from the Department of Energy. There are two types of permits needed from DOE regarding export of LNG: one to export to free-trade agreement (FTA) countries and one to export to non-FTA countries. The DOE considers several issues when deciding to issue this permit, including domestic need and public interest.¶ "Public interest" is not defined in the Natural Gas Act that grants DOE permitting power, leaving it a great deal of discretion in making this determination. If an applicant seeks permission to export natural gas to countries with which the US has a free-trade agreement in place the license is to be issued "without modification or delay" because such an application is considered to be "consistent with the public interest."1¶ If an applicant seeks permission to export natural gas to countries with which the US does not have an FTA, however, the DOE must make a public interest determination after first publicly providing notice of the filing.

#### Approving Oregon LNG threatens critical species in the Columbia River Estuary

Columbia Riverkeeper 13 (http://columbiariverkeeper.org/our-work/lng/lng-threatens-salmon/)

The remaining proposed LNG export terminal on the Columbia River—Oregon LNG—would be located in the Columbia River Estuary, considered linchpin habitat for endangered salmon and other endangered and threatened species. LNG speculators could not have selected a worse location for their mega-LNG terminal, which requires extensive dredging and heavy industrial activities.¶ “Critical” Habitat under Fire¶ The Estuary is home to thirteen populations of endangered and threatened salmon and steelhead. In fact, experts with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service designated the Estuary with the highest level of federal protection—“critical habitat”—because its protection is critical for the recovery of dwindling populations of iconic Columbia River salmon. To learn more about the life-cycle of salmon and steelhead and why the Estuary is vital for their survival, click here. The Estuary is also home to other endangered and threatened species, including green sturgeon and smelt, as well as a host of other bird, wildlife, and fish species.¶ While the Northwest invests billions of dollars in restoring habitat in the Columbia River Estuary, LNG speculators continue to charge forward with plans to destroy critical habitat and significantly increase tanker traffic, which would increase invasive species and juvenile salmon wake-stranding in the Estuary.

#### The risk of critical species loss leads to extinction – outweighs on reversibility.

Chen 2k (Jim, Professor of Law at University of Minnesota and Dean of Law School at Louisville, “Globalization and Its Losers”:, 9 Minn. J. Global Trade 157’ LexisNexis Legal)

Conscious decisions to allow the extinction of a species or the destruction of an entire ecosystem epitomize the "irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources" that NEPA is designed to retard.312 The original Endangered Species Act gave such decisions no quarter whatsoever;313 since 1979, such decisions have rested in the hands of a solemnly convened "God Squad."314 In its permanence and gravity, natural extinction provides the baseline by which all other types of extinction should be judged. The Endangered Species Act explicitly acknowledges the "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value" of endangered species and the biodiversity they represent.315 Allied bodies of international law confirm this view:316 global biological diversity is part of the commonly owned heritage of all humanity and deserves full legal protec- tion.317 Rather remarkably, these broad assertions understate the value of biodiversity and the urgency of its protection. A Sand County Almanac, the eloquent bible of the modern environmental movement, contains only two demonstrable bio- logical errors. It opens with one and closes with another. We can forgive Aldo Leopold's decision to close with that elegant but erroneous epigram, "ontogeny repeats phylogeny."318 What concerns erns us is his opening gambit: "There are some who can live without wild things, and some who cannot."319 Not quite. None of us can live without wild things. Insects are so essential to life as we know it that if they "and other land-dwelling anthropods ... were to disappear, humanity probably could not last more than a few months."320 "Most of the amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals," along with "the bulk of the flowering plants and ... the physical structure of most forests and other terrestrial habitats" would disappear in turn.321 "The land would return to" something resembling its Cambrian condition, "covered by mats of recumbent wind-pollinated vegetation, sprinkled with clumps of small trees and bushes here and there, largely devoid of animal life."322 From this perspective, the mere thought of valuing biodiver- sity is absurd, much as any attempt to quantify all of earth's planetary amenities as some trillions of dollars per year is ab- surd. But the frustration inherent in enforcing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) has shown that conservation cannot work without appeasing Homo economicus, the profit-seeking ape. Efforts to ban the interna- tional ivory trade through CITES have failed to stem the slaugh- ter of African elephants.323 The preservation of biodiversity must therefore begin with a cold, calculating inventory of its benefits. Fortunately, defending biodiversity preservation in human- ity's self-interest is an easy task. As yet unexploited species might give a hungry world a larger larder than the storehouse of twenty plant species that provide nine-tenths of humanity's cur- rent food supply.324 "Waiting in the wings are tens of thousands of unused plant species, many demonstrably superior to those in favor."325 As genetic warehouses, many plants enhance the pro- ductivity of crops already in use. In the United States alone, the lates phylogeny" means that the life history of any individual organism replays the entire evolutionary history of that organism's species. genes of wild plants have accounted for much of "the explosive growth in farm production since the 1930s."326 The contribution is worth $1 billion each year.327 Nature's pharmacy demonstrates even more dramatic gains than nature's farm.328 Aspirin and penicillin, our star analgesic and antibiotic, had humble origins in the meadowsweet plant and in cheese mold.329 Leeches, vampire bats, and pit vipers all contribute anticoagulant drugs that reduce blood pressure, pre- vent heart attacks, and facilitate skin transplants.330 Merck & Co., the multinational pharmaceutical company, is helping Costa Rica assay its rich biota.33' A single commercially viable product derived "from, say, any one species among... 12,000 plants and 300,000 insects ... could handsomely repay Merck's entire investment" of $1 million in 1991 dollars.332 Wild animals, plants, and microorganisms also provide eco- logical services.333 The Supreme Court has lauded the pes- ticidal talents of migratory birds.334 Numerous organisms process the air we breathe, the water we drink, the ground we stroll.335 Other species serve as sentries. Just as canaries warned coal miners of lethal gases, the decline or disappearance of indicator species provides advance warning against deeper environmental threats.336 Species conservation yields the great- est environmental amenity of all: ecosystem protection. Saving discrete species indirectly protects the ecosystems in which they live.337 Some larger animals may not carry great utilitarian value in themselves, but the human urge to protect these charis- matic "flagship species" helps protect their ecosystems.338 In- deed, to save any species, we must protect their ecosystems.339 Defenders of biodiversity can measure the "tangible eco- nomic value" of the pleasure derived from "visiting, photograph- ing, painting, and just looking at wildlife."340 In the United States alone, wildlife observation and feeding in 1991 generated $18.1 billion in consumer spending, $3 billion in tax revenues, and 766,000 jobs.341 Ecotourism gives tropical countries, home to most of the world's species, a valuable alternative to subsis- tence agriculture. Costa Rican rainforests preserved for ecotour- ism "have become many times more profitable per hectare than land cleared for pastures and fields," while the endangered go- rilla has turned ecotourism into "the third most important source of income in Rwanda."342 In a globalized economy where commodities can be cultivated almost anywhere, environmen- tally sensitive locales can maximize their wealth by exploiting the "boutique" uses of their natural bounty. The value of endangered species and the biodiversity they embody is "literally . . . incalculable."343 What, if anything, should the law do to preserve it? There are those that invoke the story of Noah's Ark as a moral basis for biodiversity preser- vation.344 Others regard the entire Judeo-Christian tradition, especially the biblical stories of Creation and the Flood, as the root of the West's deplorable environmental record.345 To avoid getting bogged down in an environmental exegesis of Judeo- Christian "myth and legend," we should let Charles Darwin and evolutionary biology determine the imperatives of our moment in natural "history."346 The loss of biological diversity is quite arguably the gravest problem facing humanity. If we cast the question as the contemporary phenomenon that "our descend- ants [will] most regret," the "loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats" is worse than even "energy depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war, or con- quest by a totalitarian government."347 Natural evolution may in due course renew the earth with a diversity of species approximating that of a world unspoiled by Homo sapiens - in ten mil- lion years, perhaps a hundred million.348

### 4

#### The purposes and possibilities for energy generation are channeled through technological thinking; all Beings can be reduced to an energy source

O’Brien 4 (Mahon, Professor of Philosophy at University College, Cork, Ireland, “Commentary on Heidegger’s ‘The Question Concerning Technology,” Thinking Together. Proceedings of the IWM Junior Fellows' Conference, http://www.iwm.at/publ-jvc/jc-16-01.pdf)

It is a charge which many are wont to make and one which is facilitated by the widespread conviction that it is entirely reasonable to both bracket certain features of Heidegger’s thought with a view to reappropriating them or to distinguish be- tween Sein und Zeit and much of his subsequent work. 50 **With respect to the revelatory capacity of modern technology, Heidegger is not simply bemoaning the loss of the world of yesteryear in misty-eyed sentimentality, this is not a doleful, nostalgic essay – “there is no demonry of technology” to begin with. Rather Heidegger is trying to discover what the exclusive feature of modern technology is which distinguishes it essentially from earlier types. To recapitulate, the difference pertains to the way in which modern technology** reveals**, the manner in which it allows us, and seemingly** compels us, to view the world **we live in and the Earth we live on. 51 Where once a windmill relied on the wind for its operative success or lack of it, now energy is** unlocked **from air currents, “a tract of land is** challenged **into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit**.” 52 One might object that this is to ignore the various ways in which we tradition- ally, even in our capacity as agriculturalists, challenged the Earth to provide us with a bountiful harvest, a harvest which emerged through human manipulation and contrivance of a technological, though admittedly more primitive and rustic nature. Farmers reaped what they sowed, not what the Earth chanced to grant them through multiple windfalls. How then do we reconcile this claim with Heidegger’s thoughts on technology? That is, where do we draw the line between earlier manifestations of technology, with their concomitant attempt to provide for ourselves in a way that required our very own peculiar intervention, and the modern technological attitude toward the world? In a way, the question will always resist any attempt to demarcate things rigidly – there will always be a penumbra where it is not yet clear if the transition has already been made in any genealogical account. That is not to say however, that along a spectrum we cannot notice degrees of difference which ultimately resolve into a completely new type or kind – a categorically different thing which at one end of the spectrum is easy to set in relief against the other end. Of course, part of Heidegger’s strategy in this essay is to show that such problems stem from our inability to move out from under the shadow of Enframing and some of its more conspicuous offspring such as the instrumental definition of technology. With respect to agriculture for instance: The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [be- stellte] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. 53 **What Heidegger seems very much concerned with is this imposition on the Earth**, that the Earth is set upon in a way which is disturbing from the standpoint of the sheer scale of its intrusiveness, its lack of reverence for that which it dismantles. **We no longer are part of the Earth but look to exploit it as a resource rather than seeing it as our wonderful, at times numinous home. We disassemble the natural configuration and look to manipulate and to disintegrate until something is no longer the structural item it once was but is a collection of forces, reduced to nothing but energy and resource to be exhausted or stock-piled**. There is a difference, not just in degree or intensity here, but in kind – what is revealed through modern technology is very different from what is revealed through older, cruder methods of, among other things, agriculture. For instance, Heidegger would almost certainly insist that there are important differences between the revealing which occurs within traditional planting and harvesting and that which is undertaken in genetic engineering and scientific intensive farming. Another feature which Heidegger believes is unique to the setting-upon which obtains within the essence of modern technology is the fact that it stockpiles materials and resources: The coal that has been hauled out in some mining district has not been supplied in order that it may simply be present somewhere or other. It is stockpiled; that is, it is on call, ready to deliver the sun’s warmth that is stored in it. 54 The world around us is something that we view rather differently, Heidegger argues, than earlier peoples were given to perceive, our perceptual goggles, if you will, have radically different filtration systems.

#### The rapacious drive to secure energy is a symptom of “challenging-forth,” a mindset that renders everything as disposable. Only through rejecting challenging forth and embracing bringing forth can we avoid this hollowing out of Being

Waddington 5 A Field Guide to Heidegger: Understanding 'The Question concerning Technology' more by David Waddington Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2005 http://concordia.academia.edu/DavidWaddington/Papers/538046/A\_Field\_Guide\_to\_Heidegger\_Understanding\_The\_Question\_concerning\_Technology

Most essays on technology focus primarily on practical issues surrounding the use of particular technologies . Heidegger’s essay, however, does not—instead, it focuses on the ways of thinking that lie behind technology. Heidegger (1977, p. 3) thinks that by coming to understand these ways of thinking, humans can enter into a ‘free relationship’ with technology. After dismissing the conventional account of technology, which supposedly states that technology is simply a means to an end, Heidegger commences a discussion on ancient craftsmanship. He suggests that the ancient craftsmanship involves the four Aristotelian causes: material, formal, ﬁnal, and efﬁcient. Intuitively, one might think that the efﬁcient cause of a given craft-item (the craftsman) was the most signiﬁcant of the four. However, although the craftsman has an important role in that she unites the four causes by considering each of them carefully, each of the four causes is equally co-responsible for the particular craft-item that is produced. Heidegger comments, ‘The four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance. They let it come forth into presencing’ (1977, p. 9). Appropriately enough, Heidegger names this process bringing-forth . Notably, bringing-forth is not merely a descriptive genus under which the four causes are subsumed—rather, it is a uniﬁed process, ‘a single leading-forth to which [each of the causes] is indebted’ (Lovitt, 1972, p. 46).Heidegger writes that bringing-forth ‘comes to pass only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment’ (1977, p. 11). Thus, instead of the craft-item being created by the craftsman, as one would think, it was revealed or unconcealed .In ‘The Thing’, Heidegger comments on the making of a jug, The jug is not a vessel because it was made; rather, the jug had to be made because it is this holding vessel. The making … lets the jug come into its own. But that which in the jug’s nature is its own is never brought about by its making. (1971, p. 168)Clearly, revealing/unconcealing in the mode of bringing-forth contains strong hints of Platonism. Bringing-forth is the mode of revealing that corresponds to ancient craft. Modern technology, however, has its own particular mode of revealing, which Heidegger calls challenging-forth . Thinking in the mode of challenging-forth is very different from thinking in the mode of bringing-forth: when challenging-forth, one sets upon the elements of a situation both in the sense of ordering (i.e. setting a system upon) and in a more rapacious sense (i.e. the wolves set upon the traveler and devoured him). In bringing-forth, human beings were one important element among others in the productive process; in challenging-forth, humans control the productive process. Efﬁciency is an additional important element of thinking in the mode of challeng-ing forth; the earth, for example, is set upon to yield the maximum amount of ore with the minimum amount of effort. Essentially, challenging-forth changes the way we see the world—as Michael Zimmerman pointedly remarks, ‘To be capable of transforming a forest into packaging for cheeseburgers, man must see the forest not as a display of the miracle of life, but as raw material, pure and simple’ (1977, p. 79).Production in the mode of challenging-forth reveals objects that have the status of standing-reserve . Objects that have been made standing-reserve have been reduced to disposability in two different senses of the word: (1) They are disposable in the technical sense; they are easily ordered and arranged. Trees that once stood chaotically in the forest are now logs that can be easily counted, weighed, piled, and shipped. (2) They are also disposable in the conventional sense; like diapers and cheap razors, they are endlessly replaceable/interchangeable and have little value. For the most part, challenging things forth into standing-reserve is not a laudable activity, and thus it makes sense to wonder what drives human beings to think in this way. Heidegger’s answer to this motivational question is unconventional— instead of suggesting that the origins of this motivation are indigenous to human beings, he postulates the existence of a phenomenon that ‘sets upon man to order the real as standing-reserve’ (1977, p. 19). Heidegger calls this mysterious phenomenon enframing ( Ge-stell in German). The word ‘Ge-stell’ gathers together several meanings of the -stellen family of German verbs: in Ge-stell, humans are ordered ( bestellen ), commanded ( bestellen ), and entrapped ( nachstellen ) (Harries 1994,p. 229). Heidegger thinks that our default state is that of being trapped by Ge-stell; this is what he means when he writes, ‘As the one who is challenged forth in this way, man stands within the essential realm of [Ge-stell]. He can never take up a relationship to it only subsequently’ (1977, p. 24; Sallis, 1971, p. 162). According to Heidegger (1977, p. 25), there are different ‘ordainings of destining’ for human beings. Although the default destining is that of Ge-stell, it is possible to choose an alternate road. Heidegger thinks that human beings have been granted the special role of ‘Shepherds of Being’—we have been granted the power to reveal the world in certain ways (Ballard, 1971, p. 60). Trapped in Ge-stell, we tend to reveal things in the mode of challenging-forth, but we can also choose to reveal things in the mode of bringing-forth. Heidegger comments, ‘Placed between these possibilities, man is endangered from out of destining’ (1977, p. 26). However, by carefully considering the ways of thinking that lie behind technology, we can grasp the ‘saving power’. We can realize that we, the Shepherds of Being, have a choice : we can bring-forth rather than challenge-forth. Thus, once we understand the thinking behind technology, we become free to choose our fate—‘… we are already sojourning in the open space of destining’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 26).

### Solvency

#### Exports take a decade even if they solve.

Romm 12 (Joe, Climate Progress editor, Ph.D. in physics from MIT, American Progress fellow, former acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy, "Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Is Still Bad For The Climate — And A Very Poor Long-Term Investment," Think Progress, 8-16-12, thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/16/699601/exporting-liquefied-natural-gas-lng-bad-for-climate-poor-long-term-investment/?mobile=nc, accessed 8-16-12, mss)

The NY Times piece actually makes this odd argument on behalf of LNG exports: “It will take years before any export terminals are up and running — in the meantime, producers and regulators should strengthen safeguards so that gas is extracted safely.” But this is yet another reason why LNG exports make no sense. Why would we want to start massive exports of natural gas around the end of this decade, with costly new infrastructure that until mid-century?

#### US won’t export nat gas - distant market prices undercut profits

Levi, senior fellow at CFR, 2012,

[June, Michal, David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment. Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change Council on Foreign Relations. Michael is a member of the Strategic Advisory Board for NewWorld Capital LLC, a private equity firm focused on environmental opportunities, and a member of the External Advisory Board to the Princeton University Carbon Mitigation Initiative (CMI). He holds a Bachelors of Science in mathematical physics from Queen’s University, an MA in physics from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in war studies from the

University of London. “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” <http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/06_exports_levi.pdf>]

It is far from clear that all or even most of this export volume ¶ would be used even if it were approved. A recent MIT study ¶ looked at nine scenarios for U.S. and world natural gas markets; ¶ none of them led to the emergence of significant U.S. natural ¶ gas exports, in large part because other lower cost producers ¶ undercut prices offered by the United States in distant markets ¶ (MIT 2011). Other forces, discussed in Chapter 2, could also ¶ lead global natural gas prices to converge even without U.S. ¶ exports, removing opportunities for economically attractive ¶ U.S. LNG sales.

#### AND they can’t solve political barriers- resource nationalism means the US will cap exports

Jordan 12 (Matthew, OurEnergyPolicy.org director, Enthusiasm and Concern over Natural Gas Exports," OurEnergyPolicy.org, 6-8-12, www.ourenergypolicy.org/enthusiasm-and-concern-over-natural-gas-exports/, accessed 8-16-12, mss)

An interesting update on this issue: Analysts are predicting that industrial lobbying could lead to a cap on U.S. natural gas exports. Jayesh Parmar of Baringa told Reuters, “There is a lot of lobbying in the U.S. to limit LNG exports and to instead use the gas to allow the domestic industry to benefit from low energy prices.” Political risk consultancy Eurasia Group recently wrote “Resource nationalism is the biggest political risk to U.S. LNG (exports), with many opponents to exports concerned about the impact on domestic natural gas prices.”

#### Two steps in the approval process – they only solve one

Ratner et al 11 (“U.S. Natural Gas Exports: New Opportunities, Uncertain Outcomes”, Congressional Research Service, ¶ Michael Ratner¶ Analyst in Energy Policy¶ Paul W. Parfomak¶ Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy¶ Linda Luther¶ Analyst in Environmental Policy November 4, 2011, assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R42074\_20111104.pdf)

Pursuant to provisions included under Section 3 of the NGA (15 U.S.C. § 717b), both the export of LNG and the construction or expansion of LNG terminals require authorization from DOE’s Office of Fossil Energy and from FERC. With regard to exports, any person seeking authorization¶ ￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼¶ ￼to export LNG from the United States, or to amend an existing import or export authorization, must file an application with DOE’s Office of Fossil Energy.18 Issuance of an authorization is dependent upon the export being deemed consistent with the public interest.19 If the United States has an FTA in effect with the nation to which the LNG would be exported, that application will be deemed consistent with the public interest.20 LNG exports to non-FTA countries may also be authorized, but require the Office of Fossil Energy to publish a notice of the application in the Federal Register and seek public comments, protests, and notices of intervention in order to make the public interest determination. DOE also can limit the amount of cumulative LNG exports, so each successive project may be contingent upon the volumes of previously approved projects.¶ Also under the NGA, any person proposing to site, construct, or operate facilities to be used for the export of natural gas from the United States to a foreign country or to amend an existing FERC authorization, including the modification of existing authorized facilities, must file an application for authorization with FERC.21 In addition to FERC, the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), under the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), may also be responsible for exercising some level of regulatory authority over the siting, design, construction, expansion, and operation of LNG facilities, and related land and marine safety and security issues. If an application is approved, FERC will issue of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.¶ Both an LNG export authorization from the Office of Fossil Energy and a FERC authorization regarding facility siting, construction, or expansion are required to evaluate a proposed project’s anticipated impact on the public and the environment in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.). Broadly, NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their actions before proceeding with them and to inform the public of those potential impacts.22 To ensure that environmental impacts are considered, regulations implementing NEPA require all federal agencies to provide an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for every proposed major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the environment. 23 When an EIS is approved, a final Record of Decision (ROD) is issued.

### Trade

#### They do not lift the export restrictions which means they don’t solve free trade – exports are still subject to an approval process by the federal government. They just approve export applications

#### Trade restrictions now

Beetz 12 (China concludes US solar subsidies violate WTO rules, http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/china-concludes-us-solar-subsidies-violate-wto-rules\_100008155/#ixzz2P4PTNMNx)

China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has concluded that 6 renewable energy subsidies in the U.S. violate provisions made under the WTO Subsidy and Countervailing Measures Agreement and the Article 3 of 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It is now seeking to have them cancelled.¶ US China flags¶ The bickering between the US and China continues.¶ Flickr/felibrilu¶ Following the launch of the U.S.-China trade case by SolarWorld in the U.S. last October, MOFCOM launched its own trade barrier investigation in November into 6 of the U.S.’ support polices and subsidy programs. It has since concluded that this support constitutes "prohibited subsidies" as stated under provisions in the Article 3 of WTO Subsidy and Countervailing Measures Agreement and the Article 3 of 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.¶ "As a consequence," stated MOFCOM on its website, they "distort the normal trade and constitutes the trade barrier to the Chinese renewable energy products exports to the U.S." The ministry added that it will now take "relevant measures in accordance with the law to require the U.S. to cancel the content of the measures under investigation inconsistent with WTO agreements, and give fair treatment to renewable energy products exported from China."¶ The programs in question include:¶ The encouragement of renewable energy projects in Washington;¶ The State Solar Rebate Project II in Massachusetts;¶ The encouragement of wind production and manufacturing in Ohio;¶ The encouragement of renewable energy projects and manufacturing in New Jersey; and¶ Self-generating projects in California.

#### Protectionism inevitable

Stelzer, Hudson Institute senior fellow,‘12

[Ian, “A World Headed for De-Globalization?”, 3-24-12, The Weekly Standard, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/world-headed-de-globalization_634384.html?page=2>, RSR]

We may be entering an era of creeping de-globalization. It is one thing to be generous with the perceived foibles of your trading partners when your economy is growing and jobs are plentiful. It is quite another to decide to be tolerant when your economy is struggling, and domestic political pressure to create jobs and raise wages is increasing. Which is the case both in China and the United States. America is in the midst of a drawn-out election campaign, with candidates vying for the China-basher-of-the-year award. Eager to shift blame for high unemployment and to appease an electorate that believes the country to be headed in the wrong direction, President Barack Obama is letting it be known, most especially to his trade union allies, that he is going to get tough on China for its currency manipulation, export control on rare minerals, buy-China policy, and theft of intellectual property. To which Republican candidates respond with even tougher statements. Meanwhile, control of the Communist party apparatus that runs China is about to change, the so-far peaceful version of regime change, and the new boys in charge are as eager to prove they are no pushovers for the tough-talking Americans as the American politicians are to prove they are no pushovers for the wily Chinese. And, in a situation similar to America’s, China’s manufacturing sector is not as robust as the powers-that-be would like. It is suffering its worst quarter in three years, economic growth has slowed for five successive quarters, and layoffs are running at their fastest rate in three years. “Worse may lie ahead,” says Markit’s chief economist Chris Williamson. And because wages are being raised at double-digit rates to appease a restive work force, the nation’s competitiveness is being reduced. Indeed, China has reached a point where its export-led model is under such serious threat that major reforms are being mooted. Neither these facts—China is, after all, projecting a growth rate around three times what the U.S. expects -- nor the recent trade deficits recorded by China can defuse anger with its willingness to erect barriers to American goods, including its recent decision to levy tariffs ranging from 2 percent to 21.5 percent on U.S.-made cars, apparently in retaliation for America’s decision to levy duties on imports of low-end tires made in China. As World Bank president Robert Zoellick is fond of warning those who would get tough with China, once you start a trade war, there is no telling how it will end. Tires today, autos tomorrow. If the tiffs between China and the U.S. were the entire story, it could be written off as a phenomenon that will pass once the US elections are over and the new regime in China settles in. After all, China has been manipulating its currency for decades, and the squeals of outrage from members of congress mount whenever a member of China’s ruling class visits the United States, only to subside when he is gone—or, like soon-to-be-president Xi Jinping, has reminded farmers in key electoral states how much they export to China. There are two reasons to believe that this brawl will prove more enduring and more widespread. For one thing, the informal China lobby, American businessmen hopeful of tapping the huge Chinese market, have traditionally pressured Washington politicians to cool it, to avoid an all-out trade war. That lobby seems to be fed up with restrictions on American companies’ ability to sell their goods in China, and with the persistent theft of their intellectual property—what Bloomberg Businessweek calls “The Great Brain Robbery.” So it has gone virtually silent, removing a key brake on the willingness of any American administration to retaliate. Moreover, China’s practices are now provoking reactions in countries other than the US. Germany has two new reasons for concern. The Chinese government has ordered its bureaucrats to stop buying foreign—mostly German—cars and spend their $13 billion annually on made in China vehicles. This has German auto makers, especially Volkswagen, unhappy, since Audis are the bureaucrats’ vehicle of choice, and they buy 6.5 million vehicles annually. Germany is also upset because the $30 billion in annual subsidies lavished by the Chinese government on its manufacturers of solar panels and cells is hurting German companies, until now leaders in that industry. It is the U.S. unit of Germany’s Solar-World AG that has led the successful call for the imposition by the U.S. of tariffs on China’s manufacturers of solar panels and cells, recipients of $30 billion annually in government subsidies. Add Brazil to the unhappy trading nations. It attributes the woes of its manufacturing sector to cheap Chinese imports and dumping by developed countries. “We are not going to just sit by while other countries devalue their currencies to give them a competitive advantage…. We don’t want to lose our manufacturing sector,” announced Brazil’s finance minister Guido Mantega. So taxes on foreign cars have been raised, and state-owned Petrobas will direct about 75 percent of its $225 billion capital programme, the world’s largest for any corporation, to local suppliers, a buy-local move also being considered by the EU. More important, Brazil is re-introducing currency controls to prevent the value of its real from rising. These are not “protectionist measures,” claims Mr. Mantega, they are “defensive measures” in response to “non-competitive mechanisms.” Another developing nation has joined the flight from globalization. “India is not a no-tax country, … not a tax haven, zero-tax or low-tax country,” announced finance minister Pranab Mukherjee. His new budget proposes a tax on some international mergers, retroactive to 1962. Of the foreign companies that have bought assets in India, Vodaphone is the most at risk, liable for $2.2 billion in taxes on its purchase of Indian wireless operations. Mr. Mukherjee denies this will have an adverse effect on much-needed direct foreign investment. Then there is the problem of China’s restrictions on the export of minerals, including rare earths essential to the manufacture of high-tech goods such as hybrid cars, iPads, and missiles. The EU and Japan have joined our complaint to the World Trade Organisation; China claims its export restrictions are aimed at protecting the environment rather than distorting trade.

#### Trade doesn’t solve war

May 5**—**Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Principal Investigator for the DHS. (Michael, “The U.S.-China Strategic Relationship,” September 2005, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Sep/maySep05.asp)

However important and beneficial this interdependence may be from an economic point of view, it is not likely to be a significant factor for strategic stability. Famously, economists before World War I sounded clear warnings that Europe had become economically interdependent to an extent that war there would ruin Europe. The war was fought nevertheless, Europe was duly ruined, and the ensuing political consequences haunted Europe to the end of World War II. Other cases exist. Modern war has been an economic disaster. Economic realities, including economic interdependence, play little role in whether a country goes to war or not. Economic myths certainly do and they usually affect strategic stability quite negatively. This is another reason why domestic perceptions matter: they determine which myths are believed.

### Russia

#### Depedence on Russia is inevitable – trade pacts and infrastructure prevent alternatives from mattering

Ratner et al ‘12 (Specialist in Energy Policy, Michael e-, Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs, Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and European Affairs, Steven Woehrel, Specialist in European Affairs, March 13, 2012, “Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf, 7/19/12, atl)

Collectively, EU member states are the world’s largest energy importer, importing about 55% of their energy supply—approximately 84% of their oil and 64% of their natural gas.12 EU member states increasingly rely on natural gas, particularly to reach ambitious targets to reduce carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions. Natural gas comprised over 25% of the EU’s primary energy consumption in 2010, a number that is expected to grow to almost 30% by 2030.13 Oil made up almost 40%, coal about 16%, and nuclear 12% of the EU primary energy supply. The European Commission forecasts that the EU will import over 80% of its natural gas needs by 2030. Analysts note that recent policy decisions, such as a 2011 German announcement that it would phase out use of its nuclear power plants by 2020 and a French decision to prohibit shale gas development, could mean a more rapid rise in Europe’s dependence on natural gas imports. Other EU countries have made similar announcements, but are much smaller energy consumers. Russia has long been, and is expected to continue to be, the key supplier of natural gas to Europe. In 2010, Russia accounted for 34% of European natural gas imports, followed by Norway and Algeria (see Figure 1). Russian and European companies have developed an extensive network of infrastructure to transport Russian natural gas long distances to European markets. Observers expect natural gas to play a significant role in Europe-Russia relations for decades to come. Different EU member states use natural gas to different degrees and import levels and sources vary by country (see Table 1). Some large natural gas consumers, such as Spain, do not import any natural gas from Russia. Germany, the second biggest natural gas consumer and Russia’s largest market, relied on Russia for almost 40% of its imports in 2010. The opening of the Nord Stream pipeline in late 2011 and Germany’s planned closure of its nuclear power plants highlights Germany’s potentially greater reliance on Russia. In a reflection of these national differences, the EU has traditionally exerted little if any influence over the energy policies of individual member states. However, in the face of rising concern about Europe’s reliance on Russian energy and growing public pressure to address global climate change, EU member states have begun to increase cooperation toward an “Energy Policy for Europe.” As stated earlier, European heads of state have committed to completing the integration and liberalization of the internal European energy market by 2014; promoting the interconnection of electric grids and natural gas pipelines; boosting energy efficiency; and better coordinating external energy policies. European leaders anticipate that these initiatives will allow member states to share and trade energy more flexibly than at present, mitigating the impact of potential supply interruptions and overdependence on a single supplier. Even as EU leaders promote ideas on a common energy strategy, many question how far individual member states will agree to push Russia (and Gazprom) to adopt the EU’s principles of competition and open its energy sector to outside investment. Some believe that without such Russian concessions, Europe will ultimately find its energy security largely under Russian control. Indeed, several member states have pursued bilateral energy deals with Russia that will increase their dependence on Russia for years to come. Both Germany and Italy, the largest importers of Russian natural gas, have negotiated long-term deals with Russia to lock in future natural gas supplies. For Germany and several others, Russia’s role as a dominant energy supplier increases the importance of fostering good relations with Moscow. Further, bilateral deals with Russia are not limited to the major energy consumers. Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Greece, and others have entered into long-term energy agreements with Gazprom over the past several years. These examples of individual member states dealing with Russia bilaterally have in the past drawn harsh criticism from other EU member states, such as the Baltic states and Poland, who have had strained relations with Russia for some time over other issues as well. Governments in these countries have warned their European colleagues not to make energy deals that could give Russia increased political influence over European decision-making. Many of these nations believe that Europe’s dependence on Russian energy is likely to last no matter how successful Europe may be in identifying energy supply alternatives. But they also feel Europe does not gain real security by becoming more dependent on Russia. In fact, the growing presence of Gazprom throughout the European energy market (for instance through its ownership of distribution and storage infrastructure) has led many to worry about the EU’s ability to develop an energy policy insulated from Gazprom’s influence.14

#### EU no longer dependent on Russia –

#### a. Global shale production.

Medlock et al. 11 – Dr. Kenneth B. Medlock, Ph.D. in economics, fellow in Energy and Resource Economics at the Baker Institute, and former advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy and the California Energy Commission, AND\* Amy Myers Jaffe, graduate from Princeton University, fellow of Energy Studies and director of the Energy Forum at the Baker Institute, and associate director of the Rice Energy Program, AND\* Dr. Peter R. Hartley, Ph.D in economics at Rice University, July 2011, "Shale Gas and U.S. National Security," <http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-DOEShaleGas-07192011.pdf>

Given the impacts across scenarios already highlighted, it is quite obvious that shale development has already had, and will continue to have, significant impacts on regional production, demand, and pricing. Shale gas development has already had a major impact on Russia’s status as a global gas exporter and will bring about a more dramatic weakening of Russia’s position in Europe over time. If the shale potential now being examined in Europe and Asia reveals any resemblance to what has come to fruition in North America, the impact will be potentially far reaching. In particular, it will carry implications for U.S. allies in Europe, who face a litany of energy security dilemmas surrounding the delivery of natural gas from Russia, North Africa, and the Middle East. In fact, had the shale play not emerged as a major new source of supply for North America, Europe’s dependence on Russia would have remained a major feature of global gas markets and natural gas geopolitics. Local shale gas eventually becomes a major feature of European supply under the Reference Case, following the North America example, but this would not have occurred had shale gas been limited to the Barnett shale play (see Figure 17). Under the Reference Case, Russian exports continue to grow, but the main destination for export growth is the Far East. The prime means of exports from Russia to the Far East is via the development of pipeline transport routes in both West and East Siberia. In particular, the case sees development of the Altai project from West Siberia to western China as well as pipeline development from Sakhalin and Kovykta beginning in 2014. While under this case Russian volumes to Europe decline only slightly, Russia’s market share in non-FSU Europe continues to erode, declining to less than 13 percent by 2040 (see Figure 18). None of the proposed Russian pipelines aimed at feeding the European market, except Nord Stream, are developed. Russian LNG exports from Murmansk, tied to the development of fields in the Barents Sea, and development of resources and LNG export capability from the Kara Sea and Yamal peninsula, do not occur well after 2030. These are clear signals of the lack of demand for Russian Arctic gas resources in particular.

#### b. If that’s not enough, the Nabucco pipeline fills in.

Medlock et al. 11 – Dr. Kenneth B. Medlock, Ph.D. in economics, fellow in Energy and Resource Economics at the Baker Institute, and former advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy and the California Energy Commission, AND\* Amy Myers Jaffe, graduate from Princeton University, fellow of Energy Studies and director of the Energy Forum at the Baker Institute, and associate director of the Rice Energy Program, AND\* Dr. Peter R. Hartley, Ph.D in economics at Rice University, July 2011, "Shale Gas and U.S. National Security," <http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-DOEShaleGas-07192011.pdf>

The Nabucco pipeline project has been discussed for over a decade as a further solution to diversifying the EU’s access to diverse natural gas supplies from Central Asia and Iraq. An intergovernment

al agreement for the project was signed by Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria in July 2009, and was intended to both reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas as well as create new transportation outlets for Caspian resources, thereby strengthening the political links between the Caspian nations and the EU. The 2,050 mile-long pipeline was aimed to carry 1.1 tcf of gas a year from the Middle East and the Caspian to Europe. However, the high expense of the project and doubts about the viability and timing of gas supplies have presented the project with substantial obstacles.27

#### c. Their Cunningham evidence says that “Rising LNG purchases has allowed Europe to find new suppliers for its energy needs, including Nigeria, Egypt, Trinidad and Qatar. This has led to a diversification of natural gas imports, allowing Europe to cut its dependence on Russia for natural gas from 75% in 1990 down to only 34% today.”

#### US can’t compete with Russia- productivity, volume, price

Orlov 12 (Dimitry, engineer , "Shale Gas," 5-8-12, Club Orlov, cluborlov.blogspot.it/2012/05/shale-gas-view-from-russia.html, accessed 6-3-12, mss)

The official shale gas story goes something like this: recent technological breakthroughs by US energy companies have made it possible to tap an abundant but previously inaccessible source of clean, environmentally friendly natural gas. This has enabled the US to become the world leader in natural gas production, overtaking Russia, and getting ready to end of Russia's gas monopoly in Europe. Moreover, this new shale gas is found in many parts of the world, and will, in due course, enable the majority of the world's countries to achieve independence from traditional gas producers. Consequently, the ability of those countries with the largest natural gas reserves—Russia and Iran—to control the market for natural gas will be reduced, along with their overall geopolitical influence. If this were the case, then we should expect the Kremlin, along with Gazprom, to be quaking in their boots. But are they? Here is what Gazprom's chairman, Alexei Miller, recently told Süddeutsche Zeitung: “Shale gas is a well-organized global PR-campaign. There are many of them: global cooling, biofuels.” He pointed out that the technology for producing gas from shale is many decades old, and suggested the US turned to it out of desperation. He dismissed it as an energy alternative for Europe. Is this just the other's sides propaganda, or could Miller be simply stating the obvious? Let's explore. I will base my exploration on Russian sources, which is why all the numbers are in metric units. If you want to convert to Imperial, 1 m3 = 35 cubic feet, 1 km2 = .38 square miles, 1 tonne = 1.1 short tons). The best-developed shale gas basin is Barnett in Texas, responsible for 70% of all shale gas produced to date. By “developed” I mean drilled and drilled and drilled, and then drilled some more: just in 2006 there were about as many wells drilled into Barnett shale as are currently producing in all of Russia. This is because the average Barnett well yields only around 6.35 million m3 of gas, over its entire lifetime, which corresponds to the average monthly yield of a typical Russian well that continues to produce over a 15-20 year period, meaning that the yield of a typical shale gas well is at least 200 times smaller. This hectic activity cannot stop once a well has been drilled: in order to continue yielding even these meager quantities, the wells have to be regularly subjected to hydraulic fracturing, or "fracked": to produce each thousand m3 of gas, 100 kg of sand and 2 tonnes of water, combined with a proprietary chemical cocktail, have to be pumped into the well at high pressure. Half the water comes back up and has to be processed to remove the chemicals. Yearly fracking requirements for the Barnett basin run around 7.1 million tonnes of sand and 47.2 million tonnes of water, but the real numbers are probably lower, as many wells spend much of the time standing idle. In spite of the frantic drilling/fracking activity, this is all small potatoes by Russian standards. Russia's proven reserves of natural gas amount to 43.3 trillion m3, which is about a third of the world's total. At current consumption rates, that's enough to last 72 years. Russian gas production is constrained by demand, not by supply; it is currently down simply because Eurozone is in the midst of an economic crisis. Meanwhile, US production has surged ahead, for no adequately explored reason, crashing the price and making much of it unprofitable. Let's compare: Gazprom's price at the wellhead runs from US$3 to $50 per thousand m3, depending on the region. Compare that to shale gas in the US, which runs from $80 to $320 per thousand m3. At this price, the US cannot afford to sell shale gas on the European market. Moreover, the overall volume of shale gas being produced in the US, even given the feverish drilling rate of the past couple of years, if cleaned up, liquified, and shipped to Europe in LNG tankers, would not be enough to book up just the LNG terminal in Gdańsk, Poland, which is currently standing idle. It seems that Gazprom has little to worry about.

#### Balkan conflict won’t escalate – great powers don’t want to become involved.

Mearsheimer, Political Science Professor at the University of Chicago, ‘10

[John, European Political Science: 9, 2010, EPCR Keynote Lecture, “Why is Europe Peaceful Today?”,

<http://www.palgrave-journals.com/eps/journal/v9/n3/pdf/eps201024a.pdf>, RSR]

Much has happened since then, including the dire economic crisis that we are now experiencing. It promises to have farreaching effects on European life. Nevertheless, I think that the most important development of the past two decades is the fact that Europe remains at peace. Of course, there were a handful of small wars in the Balkans during the 1990s, but the major European powers did not start them, did not exploit them for national gain, and with the help of the United States ultimately managed to shut them down. Very importantly there has been no war between any of the major powers. Indeed, there has been little security competition among them. Given Europe’s tumultuous history, this is quite remarkable. Remember that from 1900 to 1990 Europe was the site of two of the deadliest wars in recorded history followed by the Cold War. The broad sweep of European history certainly looks very different from the past two decades.

#### Empirically, Ukraine is unwilling and unable to use force with Crimea, prevents any secessionist conflict

Mizrokhi, Research assistant for the Chaire de recherche du Canada sur les conflits identitaires et le Terrorisme, 2009 [Elena, Russian ‘separatism’ in Crimea and NATO: Ukraine’s big hope, Russia’s grand gamble, August, p. 10 http://www.psi.ulaval.ca/fileadmin/psi/documents/Documents/Travaux\_et\_recherches/Crimee.pdf

In the early 1990s Crimea stood on the¶ brink of conflict and nearly became a hotspot¶ analogous to the explosive Caucasus region.61¶ Similar to the state policies in the countries of¶ the Caucasus cauldron, under the presidency¶ of Leonid Kravchuk, the Ukrainian¶ government found it difficult to promote a¶ unified nationwide political ideology to¶ encourage integration and loyalty to the new¶ state.62 Two peaks of crises occurred in¶ relations between Ukraine and Crimea. The¶ first one in May 1992, when the peninsula¶ declared sovereignty and adopted a¶ secessionist constitution, and the second one¶ during the mandate of Yuri Meshkov, a¶ Russian nationalist leader, who was elected¶ Crimean President.63 In general postindependence,¶ Kyiv has proven both hesitant¶ and hamstrung in imposing its authority in¶ the more Russophone Eastern and Southern¶ regions of Ukraine, which have pressed for¶ far reaching autonomy.64 Some scholars¶ argue that the latency of the government to¶ respond to the political happenings in Crimea¶ contributed to the absence of ethnic violence¶ in Crimea. In contrast to the Caucasus, it was¶ the reluctance of the Ukrainian authorities to¶ use force when § Marked 17:23 § suppressing the separatist¶ movement in Crimea in the mid-1990s that¶ contributed to the blood-shed free resolution¶ of the conflict in the 90s.65

## 2NC

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#### Salmon are a keystone species

Globe and Mail 9 (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/a-keystone-species/article1293902/)

A study in Washington and Oregon identified 138 species of terrestrial and marine mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians that feed on salmon.¶ Of those, nine species were so dependent on salmon their "distribution, viability, abundance and/or population status" was decided by the availability of the fish.¶ The nine species most reliant on salmon are: grizzly bear, black bear, bald eagle, Caspian tern, common merganser, harlequin duck, killer whale, osprey and river otter.¶ The report, which had input from several U.S. government agencies, advised wildlife managers to "be aware that salmon can be viewed as the centre of a broad 'functional web' of wildlife and … thus [are]a keystone species."

#### Biodiversity is the biggest internal link to extinction – newest studies prove.

Science Daily, ‘11

["Biodiversity Critical for Maintaining Multiple 'Ecosystem Services'" Cites McGill University, August 19, [www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110819155422.htm](http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110819155422.htm)]

By combining data from 17 of the largest and longest-running biodiversity experiments, scientists from universities across North America and Europe have found that previous studies have underestimated the importance of biodiversity for maintaining multiple ecosystem services across many years and places. "Most previous studies considered only the number of species needed to provide one service under one set of environmental conditions," says Prof. Michel Loreau from McGill University's biology department who supervised the study. "These studies found that many species appeared redundant. That is, it appeared that the extinction of many species would not affect the functioning of the ecosystem because other species could compensate for their loss." Now, by looking at grassland plant species, investigators have found that most of the studied species were important at least once for the maintenance of ecosystem services, because different sets of species were important during different years, at different places, for different services, and under different global change (e.g., climate or land-use change) scenarios. Furthermore, the species needed to provide one service during multiple years were not the same as those needed to provide multiple services during one year. "This means that biodiversity is even more important for maintaining ecosystem services than was previously thought," says Dr. Forest Isbell, the lead author and investigator of this study. "Our results indicate that many species are needed to maintain ecosystem services at multiple times and places in a changing world, and that species are less redundant than was previously thought." The scientists involved in the study also offer recommendations for using these results to prioritize conservation efforts and predict consequences of species extinctions. "It is nice to know which groups of species promoted ecosystem functioning under hundreds of sets of environmental conditions," says Isbell, "because this will allow us to determine whether some species often provide ecosystem services under environmental conditions that are currently common, or under conditions that will become increasingly common in the future." But Michel Loreau, of McGill, adds au cautionary note: "We should be careful when making predictions. The uncertainty over future environmental changes means that conserving as much biodiversity as possible could be a good precautionary approach."

#### Ecosystems are on the brink now, and are key to sustaining life

Black 10 (Richard Black, environment correspondent for BBC, October 18, 2010, “'Ten years' to solve nature crisis, UN meeting hears,” http://goo.gl/4l6c)

The two-week gathering aims to set new targets for conserving life on Earth. Japan's Environment Minister Ryo Matsumoto said biodiversity loss would become irreversible unless curbed soon. Much hope is being pinned on economic analyses showing the loss of species and ecosystems is costing the global economy trillions of dollars each year. Ahmed Djoghlaf, executive secretary of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), described the meeting in Nagoya, Japan, as a "defining moment" in the history of mankind. "[Buddhist scholar] Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki said 'the problem of nature is the problem of human life'. Today, unfortunately, human life is a problem for nature," he told delegates in his opening speech. Referring to the target set at the UN World Summit in 2002, he said: "Let's have the courage to look in the eyes of our children and admit that we have failed, individually and collectively, to fulfil the Johannesburg promise made by 110 heads of state to substantially reduce the rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010. "Let us look in the eyes of our children and admit that we continue to lose biodiversity at an unprecedented rate, thus mortgaging their future." Earlier this year, the UN published a major assessment - the Global Biodiversity Outlook - indicating that virtually all trends spanning the state of the natural world were heading downwards, despite conservation successes in some regions. “ Start Quote We are about to reach a threshold beyond which biodiversity loss will become irreversible” Ryo Matsumoto Japanese environment minister It showed that loss and degradation of forests, coral reefs, rivers and other elements of the natural world was having an impact on living standards in some parts of the world - an obvious example being the extent to which loss of coral affects fish stocks. In his opening speech, Mr Matsumoto suggested impacts could be much broader in future. "All life on Earth exists thanks to the benefits from biodiversity in the forms of fertile soil, clear water and clean air," he said. "We are now close to a 'tipping point' - that is, we are about to reach a threshold beyond which biodiversity loss will become irreversible, and may cross that threshold in the next 10 years if we do not make proactive efforts for conserving biodiversity." Climate clouds In recent years, climate change has dominated the agenda of environmental politics. And Achim Steiner, executive director of the UN Environment Programme, suggested there is a lack of understanding at political levels of why tackling biodiversity is just important. "This is the only planet in this Universe that is known to have this kind of life," he said. "This fact alone should give us food for thought, But more importantly, we are destroying the very foundations that sustain life on this planet; and yet when we meet in these intergovernmental fora, society somehow struggles to understand and appreciate what it is what we're trying to do here, and why it matters."

#### Biodiversity collapse causes extinction

Young 10 (Dr Ruth Young, PhD specialising in coastal marine ecology. 2-9-2010, “Biodiversity: what it is and why it’s important”, http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/02/biodiversity/biodiversity-what-and-why/)

Different species within ecosystems fill particular roles, they all have a function, they all have a niche. They interact with each other and the physical environment to provide ecosystem services that are vital for our survival. For example plant species convert carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and energy from the sun into useful things such as food, medicines and timber. A bee pollinating a flower (Image: ClearlyAmbiguous Flickr) Pollination carried out by insects such as bees enables the production of ⅓ of our food crops. Diverse mangrove and coral reef ecosystems provide a wide variety of habitats that are essential for many fishery species. To make it simpler for economists to comprehend the magnitude of services offered by biodiversity, a team of researchers estimated their value – it amounted to $US33 trillion per year. “By protecting biodiversity we maintain ecosystem services” Certain species play a “keystone” role in maintaining ecosystem services. Similar to the removal of a keystone from an arch, the removal of these species can result in the collapse of an ecosystem and the subsequent removal of ecosystem services. The most well known example of this occurred during the 19th century when sea otters were almost hunted to extinction by fur traders along the west coast of the USA. This led to a population explosion in the sea otters’ main source of prey, sea urchins. Because the urchins graze on kelp their booming population decimated the underwater kelp forests. This loss of habitat led to declines in local fish populations. Sea otters are a keystone species once hunted for their fur (Image: Mike Baird) Eventually a treaty protecting sea otters allowed the numbers of otters to increase which inturn controlled the urchin population, leading to the recovery of the kelp forests and fish stocks. In other cases, ecosystem services are maintained by entire functional groups, such as apex predators (See Jeremy Hance’s post at Mongabay). During the last 35 years, over fishing of large shark species along the US Atlantic coast has led to a population explosion of skates and rays. These skates and rays eat bay scallops and their out of control population has led to the closure of a century long scallop fishery. These are just two examples demonstrating how biodiversity can maintain the services that ecosystems provide for us, such as fisheries. One could argue that to maintain ecosystem services we don’t need to protect biodiversity but rather, we only need to protect the species and functional groups that fill the keystone roles. However, there are a couple of problems with this idea. First of all, for most ecosystems we don’t know which species are the keystones! Ecosystems are so complex that we are still discovering which species play vital roles in maintaining them. In some cases its groups of species not just one species that are vital for the ecosystem. Second, even if we did complete the enormous task of identifying and protecting all keystone species, what back-up plan would we have if an unforseen event (e.g. pollution or disease) led to the demise of these ‘keystone’ species? Would there be another species to save the day and take over this role? Classifying some species as ‘keystone’ implies that the others are not important. This may lead to the non-keystone species being considered ecologically worthless and subsequently over-exploited. Sometimes we may not even know which species are likely to fill the keystone roles. An example of this was discovered on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. This research examined what would happen to a coral reef if it were over-fished. The “over-fishing” was simulated by fencing off coral bommies thereby excluding and removing fish from them for three years. By the end of the experiment, the reefs had changed from a coral to an algae dominated ecosystem – the coral became overgrown with algae. When the time came to remove the fences the researchers expected herbivorous species of fish like the parrot fish (Scarus spp.) to eat the algae and enable the reef to switch back to a coral dominated ecosystem. But, surprisingly, the shift back to coral was driven by a supposed ‘unimportant’ species – the bat fish (Platax pinnatus). The bat fish was previously thought to feed on invertebrates – small crabs and shrimp, but when offered a big patch of algae it turned into a hungry herbivore – a cow of the sea – grazing the algae in no time. So a fish previously thought to be ‘unimportant’ is actually a keystone species in the recovery of coral reefs overgrown by algae! Who knows how many other species are out there with unknown ecosystem roles! In some cases it’s easy to see who the keystone species are but in many ecosystems seemingly unimportant or redundant species are also capable of changing niches and maintaining ecosystems. The more biodiverse an ecosystem is, the more likely these species will be present and the more resilient an ecosystem is to future impacts. Presently we’re only scratching the surface of understanding the full importance of biodiversity and how it helps maintain ecosystem function. The scope of this task is immense. In the meantime, a wise insurance policy for maintaining ecosystem services would be to conserve biodiversity. In doing so, we increase the chance of maintaining our ecosystem services in the event of future impacts such as disease, invasive species and of course, climate change. This is the international year of biodiversity – a time to recognize that biodiversity makes our survival on this planet possible and that our protection of biodiversity maintains this service.

### Trade

#### No risk of resource nationalism - US is the largest fuel exporter in the world now

Chandra 2/8 (Shobhana, Oil Exports Trim US Deficit as Fuel Gap Shrinks: Economy, February 8, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-08/trade-deficit-in-u-s-plunges-on-record-petroleum-exports.html)

A surge in U.S. oil production has made the nation the world’s largest fuel exporter. Petroleum-product exports to Brazil grew by 59 percent in the first 11 months of 2012, to 255,000 barrels a day, according to data from the Energy Information Administration. Venezuelan imports from the U.S. rose 56 percent.¶ The U.S. met 84 percent of its own energy needs in the first 10 months of 2012, on track to be the highest annual rate since 1991, according to data from the EIA, the statistical arm of the Energy Department. The country’s crude output grew by a record 766,000 barrels a day last year to the highest level in 15 years, the biggest annual jump since the first commercial well was drilled in Pennsylvania in 1859.¶ At the same time, the rising fuel efficiency of the average U.S. passenger vehicle has helped limit demand for oil. It increased to 33.8 miles per gallon last year, according to preliminary data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. That compares with 29 mpg in 2011 and 19.9 mpg in 1978.

#### And collapse of trade doesn’t cause war

Bremmer 9**—**IR prof, Columbia. Faculty member at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Senior Fellow, World Policy Institute. PhD in pol sci, Stanford. (Ian, “The Political Risks From Washington,” 24 March 2009, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/03/top\_five\_risks\_and\_a\_red\_herri.html)

There is one serious risk I think we can downplay--a global trade war. The past months have brought all sorts of fears of growing US protectionism and the spiraling international reaction. And a wide array of localized protectionist measures have been taken around the world-indeed, the world bank has counted about 50 trade restrictive actions and only a dozen liberalizing ones since the G20 countries promised to forestall protectionism last November. To list just a few examples--multiple countries have given low cost or no cost cash to their automakers; the United States has restricted stimulus procurement to a subset of countries under a "Buy American" provision; in response to US cancellation of a Mexican trucking program that country has put over $2 billion in tariffs in place on trade with the United States. But thinking about the magnitude rather than the quantity of events uncovers that this is more conventional, rather narrow protectionism than the opening salvos of a trade war. Certainly in the United States, the highest stakes for protectionism are around the automotive sector (after all, the millions of jobs potentially at stake would undo the Obama administration's job preservation goals in one swoop). But there has been no serious suggestion of raising tariffs on foreign autos, and congressional votes and nationwide polls have made clear that there is no public will to keep the industry alive through massive subsidy. If the auto sector-where unionized labor and management could easily point to foreign competition as a cause of its problems-is not enough to merit nuclear protectionism, what is? Nothing, probably. The biggest silver lining to the economic and financial crisis in the United States is that it has very little to do with globalization. To date, there has been no blaming foreigners; rather, the recession has been a story of domestic greed and poor oversight. Certainly, as Americans feel poorer, the risk of redistribution from the have-lots to the have-littles increases. But it's not a backlash against interconnectedness, trade, or global supply chains.

### Russia

#### US production doesn’t affect international prices—experts agree

Hogue, energy writer, 12

(Thomas Hogue, writer for Platts’ The Barrel, 6/14/2012, “US shale gas going nowhere fast as LNG”, The Barrel, http://www.platts.com/weblog/oilblog/2012/06/14/us\_shale\_gas\_go.html)

The idea that a wave of LNG produced from US shale gas fields is ready to crash over Asian consumer markets, disrupting traditional supply routes and oil-linked pricing mechanisms doesn't hold much water with producers in the Middle East, Australia and Southeast Asia. "Reality says that there will be a finite amount of gas out of the US. The amount of gas coming out of the US, in and of itself, if it's in the 30 million-50 million mt/year range, is not enough to fundamentally change the market," said Woodside Petroleum CEO Peter Coleman last week at the World Gas Conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. "What it does is provide another supply source and more head-to-head competition ... but it's not going to fundamentally change the market." The Woodside chief -- as head of a company operating LNG plants that ship 20.6 million mt/year to Asia -- may have a vested interested in propagating that viewpoint, but his was not an uncommon sentiment at WGC 2012. It would be reasonable in the long term to expect some North American LNG to meet a portion of the Asian demand, but it is likely to be more of a niche source of supply, said John Harris, director of global gas group at IHS CERA. "A majority of [Asia's] supply is and will be met from Malaysia, Indonesia, ME, Australia [and] Brunei," he said. Others that held similar views included Total CEO Christophe de Margerie; Santos vice president for Western Australia and Northern Territory, John Anderson; Rasgas Managing Director Hamad Rashid al-Mohannadi; and other analysts and market observers attending last week's gas industry gathering.

#### Crimean separatist movements are empirically weak and Russia won’t get drawn in

Mizrokhi, Research assistant for the Chaire de recherche du Canada sur les conflits identitaires et le Terrorisme, 2009 [Elena, Russian ‘separatism’ in Crimea and NATO: Ukraine’s big hope, Russia’s grand gamble, August, p. 10 http://www.psi.ulaval.ca/fileadmin/psi/documents/Documents/Travaux\_et\_recherches/Crimee.pdf

In its quest to regain control of its¶ territory, Kyiv, was undoubtedly aided by the¶ fragility and instability of the pro-Russian¶ separatist coalition. The secessionist¶ movement in Crimea collapsed in 94-95 due¶ to internal quarrels, lack of substantial¶ Russian support and Ukrainian economic,¶ political and military pressure.66 Support for¶ the Russia Bloc disintegrated by the end of¶ 1994 due to infighting between the Crimean¶ Supreme Soviet and the Crimean president.¶ The Russian nationalists were also unable to¶ deal with the economic crisis or attract¶ foreign investment and tourists.67 The¶ Russian Bloc had always been a compromise¶ of two tendencies. One of these had stood for¶ a sovereign, democratic Crimean state in¶ union with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia¶ within the CIS. The second more radical¶ strand called for unification of Crimea with¶ Russia. This last movement was too radial for¶ most Crimeans and never received support¶ from Russia, unlike covert Russian support¶ for Abkhaz and Trans-Dniester separatism.68¶ By mid- to late 1994, the Russian¶ movement’s failure to deliver effective¶ socioeconomic policies discredited it in the¶ voters’ eyes.69 Russian nationalists were also¶ at a distinct disadvantage in two areas¶ compared to other CIS conflicts. First, Russia¶ provided little support beyond rhetoric.¶ Second, the Ukrainian authorities controlled¶ the security forces stationed in the Crimea,¶ with the exception of the BSF, which proved¶ to be an important deterrent against violent¶ political acts.70 All in all, the pro-Russian¶ movement in Crimea was neither sufficiently¶ unified nor considered important enough by¶ Russia to support these separatist - the two¶ element that have led to the downfall of¶ Russian ‘separatism in the 90s.

## 1NR

### Solvency

#### US wouldn’t export gas – no export facilities.

Levi, senior fellow at CFR, 2012,

[June, Michal, David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment. Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change Council on Foreign Relations. Michael is a member of the Strategic Advisory Board for NewWorld Capital LLC, a private equity firm focused on environmental opportunities, and a member of the External Advisory Board to the Princeton University Carbon Mitigation Initiative (CMI). He holds a Bachelors of Science in mathematical physics from Queen’s University, an MA in physics from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in war studies from the

University of London. “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” <http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/06_exports_levi.pdf>]

There is a real possibility that prices in the United States, ¶ Europe, and Asia will continue to diverge, creating ¶ opportunities for U.S. LNG exports. Yet exporting ¶ natural gas overseas is not a straightforward endeavor. Gas must ¶ be liquefied before it can be transported in specially built ships ¶ and then regasified at its destination. Building liquefaction ¶ facilities in particular can cost as much as $4 billion for each ¶ billion cubic feet of daily export capacity—several times the ¶ cost of building an import terminal of similar scale (Ratner ¶ et al. 2011). Investment on this scale can be risky: if natural ¶ gas price spreads collapse, multibillion-dollar investments can ¶ quickly become worthless. Adding to the dangers involved in ¶ building any terminal is regulatory risk associated with safety ¶ and security concerns.

#### Another alt cause would be port infrastructure – dredging, shipping and sea lanes all would have to be redone.

Ebinger, senior fellow at Brookings, 2012,

[May, Charles Ebinger is a senior fellow and director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings. He has more than 35 years of experience specializing in international and domestic energy markets (oil, gas, coal, and nuclear) and the geopolitics of energy, and has served as an energy policy advisor to over 50 governments. He has served as an adjunct professor in energy economics at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.“Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger]

The successful export of LNG will depend upon ¶ the necessary shipping infrastructure and capacity being in place. Cheniere Energy is looking to ¶ export up to 2.2 bcf/day of gas from its Sabine Pass ¶ LNG terminal in Louisiana.¶ 39¶ Depending on the ¶ size of the LNG vessel, this would require between ¶ three and five supertankers per week. In order to ¶ accommodate this volume of large ships, some domestic U.S. ports will require additional dredging. ¶ Other shipping-related concerns include security ¶ of vessels and the adequacy of Coast Guard capacity to provide that security (exporters must meet ¶ Coast Guard Waterway Suitability, Security, and ¶ Emergency standards prior to approval); and the ¶ capacity of sea lanes, particularly to Asia. Increasing shipments to Asia will depend on the capacity of the Panama Canal, which is currently too ¶ small to accommodate most LNG tankers. However, after the planned expansion of the canal is ¶ completed—expected to be in 2014—roughly 80 ¶ percent of the world’s LNG tankers will be able to ¶ pass through the isthmus, resulting in a dramatic ¶ decline in shipping costs to Asia.¶ 40

#### FTA agreements another barrier that increase the timeframe.

Levi, senior fellow at CFR, 2012,

[June, Michal, David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment. Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change Council on Foreign Relations. Michael is a member of the Strategic Advisory Board for NewWorld Capital LLC, a private equity firm focused on environmental opportunities, and a member of the External Advisory Board to the Princeton University Carbon Mitigation Initiative (CMI). He holds a Bachelors of Science in mathematical physics from Queen’s University, an MA in physics from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in war studies from the

University of London. “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” <http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/06_exports_levi.pdf>]

The approved facilities, once fully built, could ¶ process 10.9 billion cubic feet of exports each day, and, as of ¶ May 2012, applications for another 2.8 billion cubic feet of ¶ daily exports were pending (DOE 2012). ¶ However, no major LNG importer other than South Korea has ¶ an applicable FTA with the United States (Ratner et al. 2011). ¶ Would-be exporters have thus sought approval to export ¶ without restriction. Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass Facility has ¶ received DOE and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ¶ (FERC) approval for 2.2 billion cubic feet of daily LNG exports ¶ to non-FTA countries, and applications totaling another 10.3 ¶ billion cubic feet per day are under review. These combined ¶ applications involve total volumes similar to current U.S. LNG ¶ import capacity (Guegel 2010). Exports from the first facilities ¶ would start no earlier than 2015.

#### No solvency and status quo solves- global production collapses export profitability

Medlock 12 (Kenneth, Baker Institute Energy and Resource Economics fellow , PhD in economics from Rice University, Rice University economics professor, Baker Institute Energy Forum’s natural gas program director, International Association for Energy Economics council member, United States Association for Energy Economics President for Academic Affairs, member of the American Economic Association and the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, "US LNG Exports: Truth and Consequence," 8-10-12, bakerinstitute.org/publications/US%20LNG%20Exports%20-%20Truth%20and%20Consequence%20Final\_Aug12-1.pdf, accessed 8-16-12, mss)

The Viability of US LNG Exports¶ The prospect of exporting LNG from the US to consumers in Asia and Europe arises from the fact that spot prices for natural gas in both Europe and Asia are well above the current spot price at Henry Hub, as indicated in Figure 5, so much so that any trade evaluated at current market conditions looks very profitable. However, current market conditions do not define long-term commerciality of a trade; future market conditions do. Therefore, we must develop an assessment of the future given our state of knowledge today. To evaluate the likelihood of long- term profitable LNG exports from the US, we used the latest Reference Case of Rice World Gas Trade Model (RWGTM). In short, the Baker Institute projects that the next three decades do not indicate a future in which exports from the US Gulf Coast are profitable in the long term, at least not if developers are seeking a competitive rate of return to capital. 13 As outlined above, we know from international trade theory that upon the introduction of US LNG exports, the degree to which the price in the US increases and the degree to which the price abroad decreases will be dependent on the relative elasticities in the two markets. So, we simply need to assess the relative elasticities in the two markets to determine what is likely to happen in practice. In the US market, domestic production has risen dramatically in the past few years resulting in prices being driven down from double-digit highs in 2008 to the current environment in the low $3 per mcf range. Aside from the lack of heating demand this past winter, the softening of price in North America since 2008 is the result of innovations that have made recovery of natural gas from shale a commercial reality, and is indicative, more generally, of a domestic supply curve that has become relatively elastic. Notice, when evaluating the domestic price impacts of LNG exports, this should push our focus into the upper half of the diagram in Figure 7. An important point is worth emphasis here. We mention above that the long-term equilibrium price is likely to be in the $4 to $6 per mcf range. The current price environment is at least partly the result of an unexpected negative shock to demand in the US. In other words, we had a warm winter, which means demand is unexpectedly below normal, even with the current weakness in the US economy. Being unexpected, producers can only respond after the fact. This is another example of a short-term constraint (on demand in this case) that has exacerbated the current price spread between North America and the rest of the world. It also means that the correct point of reference when considering the impact of LNG exports from the US on domestic prices is the long-run equilibrium, since that is where prices will settle even without exports. Also in the last couple of years, increases in demand in Asia have tended to push price up. Moreover, given the lack of alternatives/competition for Asian consumers in particular, large rents are being earned in the short run by LNG suppliers to the Asian market. This all stems from the realization of a short-run capacity constraint, or a situation where supply is highly inelastic. Again referring to Figure 7, this will tend to push us into Quadrant I, meaning the introduction of LNG exports from the US will likely see most of the price response in the foreign market as the short-run capacity constraint abroad is relieved. Under virtually every condition described by Figure 7, the current price differential that exists between the US natural gas price and prices overseas will fall with the introduction of US LNG exports. Of course the volumes associated with a particular decline in the price spread will depend on the relative elasticities. In particular, if we move to the far upper right corner of Quadrant II, a large volume would be needed to erode the price differential. However, moving toward virtually any other corner on the diagram will require very little traded volume to see the price difference collapse. Given the short-run nature of the supply constraint in Asia, one should also expect that competing potential opportunities to provide natural gas supplies to the Asian market will be evaluated and perhaps even taken. Examples of competing projects could include development of unconventional resources in Asia, pipeline import options from Russia, Central Asia, and/or South Asia, and/or competing LNG supplies from Australia, East Africa, the Middle East, and/or North America. In other words, the current arbitrage opportunity is being aided by short-run inelasticity of supply in and to Asia. In the long run, this cannot be expected to persist, and the development of new supplies from outside the US will only serve to further erode regional price differentials, all else equal. Indeed, modeling at the Baker Institute indicates that prices outside of North America will likely soften relative to their current levels. This reflects several factors:  For one, longer term shale developments in places such as China, India, Australia, and several countries in Europe will become commercially attractive in price environments in excess of $7 per mcf. Thus, foreign shale supplies effectively serves as a sort of backstop on long-term prices. Secondly, the development of pipeline supplies from Russia, Central Asia, and South Asia to China will displace the need for LNG. This frees up those supplies for consumers in Korea and Japan. So, pipes serve as another point of competition for LNG longer term, particularly in developing continental markets.  Third, exchange rate movements will affect dollar-denominated supplies abroad. In particular, if the US dollar strengthens relative to its recent historical lows against major traded currencies, the evaluation of dollar-denominated arbitrage opportunities will change. This will tend to lower the current spreads between the US and Asia and the US and Europe, but importantly, this will not be due to any fundamental shift in the physical value of the commodity. Effectively, a stronger dollar makes dollar-denominated commodities more expensive.  Fourth, growth in competition will foster increased liquidity, and a movement away from the traditional pricing paradigm of long-term oil-linked contracts. Importantly, there is no guarantee that movement away from oil-indexation will result in natural gas prices falling longer term relative to crude oil; rather, a lack of oil-indexation should only mean that gas will be priced according to marginal cost. Each of these points has implications for US LNG exports to Asia and Europe. Global Shale Gas Opportunities and Foreign Supply Developments Relatively high prices in Europe and Asia have already encouraged supply responses from shale and other resources in those markets. While the initial forays into shale in Europe and other regions have proven to be more costly than the experience in the US, much of that is due to lack of equipment and personnel and will likely prove transitory as high quality opportunities are identified. The prospects for shale developments longer term in China, in Australia, and in Argentina (which could serve the Pacific basin via LNG) all look promising. With the Chinese natural gas market expected to be the primary source of growth for LNG suppliers in the coming decades, the large assessments for recoverable shale gas in China is certainly something to be considered. 14[14 In fact, the Baker Institute paper authored by Kenneth B. Medlock III and Peter Hartley entitled “Quantitative Analysis of Scenarios for Chinese Domestic Unconventional Natural Gas Resources and Their Role in Global LNG Markets” revealed that shale gas developments in China could be every bit as game-changing over the next couple of decades as shale gas developments in North America have been in the last decade. The study is available online at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-RiseOfChinaMedlockHartley-120211-WEB.pdf.] Aside from unconventional natural gas resources, recent finds in offshore basins in the Eastern Mediterranean and East Africa may prove to be highly competitive resources that can serve demands in both Europe and Asia. While these sources of supply in particular would have to be transported as LNG, there are also viable sources of supply in both Western Siberia and Eastern Russia that could be transported by pipeline to Asia. In addition, Iraqi supplies by pipeline to Europe also remain a potential. To make matters more complex, supplies from Central and South Asia already or soon will enjoy pipeline links to China, and discussions continue regarding alternatives for Central Asian supply routes to Europe. Altogether, the evidence is substantial that the long-run supply curve outside of North America is much more elastic than the current market might indicate, and development of these supplies will ultimately bring prices down. In fact, this is a major point of competition for US LNG export projects currently under consideration. Specifically, if shale opportunities in Europe and Asia, and other sources of imported pipeline and LNG supply can be brought to market, then growth in global production will put downward pressure on prices everywhere. Of course, geopolitical and regulatory uncertainties and constraints could overwhelm commercial considerations, but even if these “above-ground” constraints do exist, they would have to be substantial, widespread and persistent given the number of competing supply opportunities that exist in the longer term. In sum, US LNG exports face risk from foreign supply developments. This is eerily reminiscent of the rush to build LNG import capacity in the US in the early 2000s, which ultimately turned out to be ex post ill-conceived investments due to US domestic supply response.

### Energy Diplomacy DA

#### DA outweighs on timeframe – nuclearization will be quick – now is key.

CBS News 3/5 [“Iran ‘running the clock’ on nuclear talks, Kerry says,” Lindsey Boerma, 3/5/2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250\_162-57572619/iran-running-the-clock-on-nuclear-talks-kerry-says/]

Iran is "running the clock," Secretary of State John Kerry says, with no agreement in sight out of negotiations to derail the country's pursuit of a nuclear weapon. One day after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) that a "clear and credible military threat" is needed to thwart Iran's nuclear enrichment program "before it's too late," Kerry told CBS News correspondent Margaret Brennan that talks among P5+1 - a group committed to a diplomatic approach to Iran's nuclear program - have not yielded results. "They're running the clock," Kerry said of Iran, but added, "I'm not going to speculate today as to when it runs out. Clearly, this is not just an indefinite period of negotiations. "We're not going to negotiate for the sake of negotiations," he continued. "They have to be productive." Reminded of a statement by Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that the country won't engage in negotiations with a gun to its head - a reference to dozens of sanctions imposed in recent years by the United States and the European Union - Kerry suggested the president might consider easing his pressure on Iran. "Clearly, if Iran steps up in good faith, and is prepared to take steps to prove that their program is peaceful," Kerry said, "I'm confident President Obama will meet them in an appropriate way to get where we want to go, which is still a peaceful resolution of this problem." Kerry echoed Vice President Joe Biden's remarks to AIPAC that while all options - including military force - are on the table with respect to Iran, the United States is not looking for war. Still, he said, there's been no agreement in Iran's talks with P5+1, which includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, "so that's why the clock is ticking."

#### Plan would trigger fights with Russia and China – requires diplomatic capital.

Klare, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, 12 (Michael, “Is Barack Obama Morphing Into Dick Cheney?” 21 June 2012, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/barack-obama-energy-dick-cheney, da 1-14-13) PC

When you get two figures as different as Obama and Cheney pursuing the same pathways in the world—and the first time around was anything but a success—it's a sign of just how closed and airless the world of Washington really has become. At a time when most Americans are weary of grand ideological crusades, the pursuit of what looks like simple national self-interest—in the form of assured energy supplies—may appear far more attractive as a rationale for military and political involvement abroad. ¶ In addition, Obama and his advisers are no doubt influenced by talk of a new "golden age" of North American oil and gas, made possible by the exploitation of shale deposits and other unconventional—and often dirty—energy resources. According to projections given by the Department of Energy, US reliance on imported energy is likely to decline in the years ahead (though there is a domestic price to be paid for such "independence"), while China's will only rise—a seeming geopolitical advantage for the United States that Obama appears to relish. ¶ It is easy enough to grasp the appeal of such energy geopolitics for White House strategists, especially given the woeful state of the US economy and the declining utility of other instruments of state power. And if you are prepared to overlook the growing environmental risks of reliance on offshore oil, shale gas, and other unconventional forms of energy, rising US energy output conveys certain geopolitical advantages. But as history suggests, engaging in aggressive global geopolitical confrontations with other determined, well-armed players usually leads to friction, crisis, war, and disaster. ¶ In this regard, Cheney's geopolitical maneuvering led us into two costly Middle Eastern wars while heightening tensions with both China and Russia. President Obama claims he seeks to build a more peaceful world, but copying the Cheney energy blueprint is bound to produce the exact opposite.

#### Plan is a distraction – Obama’s second term will be minimalist, which allows Kerry to focus on Iran.

Walt, professor of international relations at Harvard University, 12-28 (Stephen M., Looking back and looking forward, Foreign Policy, 28 December 2012, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/category/region/middle\_east, da 1-5-13) PC

What do I conclude from all this? That Obama is going to pursue a minimalist foreign policy during his second term. It won't be entirely passive, of course, and we certainly won't see a retreat to isolationism or the abrupt severing of any long-standing security ties. Drone strikes and semi-covert operations will undoubtedly continue (despite the growing evidence that they are counter-productive), but most Americans won't know what's going on and won't really care. In short, expect to see a largely reactive policy that eschews bold initiatives and mostly tries to keep things from going downhill too rapidly in any place that matters.¶ If President Obama is looking for a legacy -- and what two-term president doesn't? -- it will be on the domestic side. He'll hope to end his second term with his health care plan firmly institutionalized, an economy in robust recovery, and with budget and tax reforms that reassure the markets about America's long-term fiscal solvency. Given where things stood in 2009, that's a legacy Obama would be happy to accept. And the lofty international goals with which he took office, and which won him the world's least deserved Nobel Prize? Well, a lot of them were smart and sensible, but thinking he could achieve them all just wasn't that realistic.

#### Kerry’s diplomatic capital is finite especially in the context of new Middle East policies

Foreign Times 2-28 (John Kerry: an able performer in a tough role, The Economist, Foreign Times, 28 February 2013, http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/02/#axzz2NLY74YLL, da 3-12-13) PC

But beyond early assessments of whether Mr Kerry is up to the job, we must acknowledge that success as secretary of state depends increasingly these days on the ability of a skilled manager to do more with less. This president’s stated policy goals focus overwhelmingly on the domestic side, and when boasting of his first-term foreign policy achievements, Barack Obama speaks mainly of bringing soldiers home, reducing the leverage of US diplomats at international bargaining tables.¶ As for this first trip, it’s no surprise that Mr Kerry begins his work in Europe and the Middle East, the two regions he knows best. Friendships in London, Berlin, Paris, Rome, Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha will serve him well. His challenge in Europe will be to keep the US involved in the process of eurozone reform without offering much direct material help and to create momentum behind a transatlantic trade pact that will take years to negotiate.¶ In the Middle East, the first step will be to try to stop the carnage in Syria and help prepare the ground for a capable new government. He scored an early apparent success by helping persuade opposition leaders to join talks on Syria’s future. Yet Mr Kerry knows well that here, as in other Middle East hotspots, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran will have significant say in how a post-Assad Syria develops in coming years. Particularly given the “pivot” of more US resources and attention to Asia, America’s direct involvement will be more limited than in the past, and every government in the Middle East knows it.

#### Energy subsidies are falling – stimulus phase-out and GOP opposition.

NYT 5-5 (The End of Clean Energy Subsidies? New York Times, 5 May 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-clean-energy-subsidies.html, da 8-16-12)

If nothing changes, clean energy funding will drop from a peak of $44.3 billion in 2009 to $16 billion this year and $11 billion in 2014 — a 75 percent decline.¶ This alarming news is contained in a new report from experts at the Brookings Institution, the World Resources Institute and the Breakthrough Institute. It is a timely effort to attach real numbers to an increasingly politicized debate over energy subsidies. While Mr. Obama is busily defending subsidies, the Republicans have used the costly market failure of one solar panel company, Solyndra, to indict the entire federal effort to encourage nascent technologies.

#### Allowing for sanctions tanks 1 on 1 talks.

News.Az 3/27 [“Talks with US likely if bans lifted, Iran says,” Wed 27 March 2013 at http://www.news.az/articles/iran/78192]

An Iranian legislator says Washington's calls for direct negotiations with Tehran would be real and tangible only if the US administration abandons its animosity towards Iran. “The United States must end its enmity with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Otherwise, its offers of direct talks would be nothing more than a deception” Mohammad Ali Pourmokhtar said on Tuesday. He noted that removal of sanctions together with cessation of anti-Iran conspiracies and pressures are the prerequisite for the one-on-one talks between Tehran and Washington. Pourmokhtar also rejected talks with the United States under pressure and threats, noting that no political rationale would agree with such negotiations. On March 21, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei alluded to the US repeated offers of direct talks with Iran and said, “Through different ways and messages, the Americans try to negotiate with us on the nuclear issue, but I am not optimistic about these talks.” “I am not opposed to talks with regard to the nuclear issue, but certain issues must be clarified,” Ayatollah Khamenei said. The Leader added, “Negotiation is an American tactic for deceiving the public opinion and if it is otherwise the Americans should prove it.” A day after the Leader’s remarks, US Secretary of State John F. Kerry expressed Washington’s “strong” commitment to settle its differences with Iran. "Despite the difficult history of the last decades between the United States and Iran, there is an opportunity to work diplomatically to reduce tensions and address the mistrust between our two countries, to the mutual benefit of both of our people," Kerry said in a statement.

#### Kerry is pressuring Iran, and his capital is key.

Barnes 1-24 (Diane, Kerry Commits "Totally" to Iran Sanctions Enforcement, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 January 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/kerry-state-department-nomination/, da 3-12-13) PC

U.S. Secretary of State-designate John Kerry on Thursday pledged to commit "totally" to enforcing a regime of unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran if the Senate confirms his nomination to assume the nation's top diplomatic post.¶ Kerry issued the assurance in response to questioning from Senator Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), who during President Obama's first term helped to develop and push into law several sets of economic penalties aimed at nudging Iran toward allaying international fears over the end goal of its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program. The lawmaker, who chaired Kerry's confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted the State Department's critical role in implementing a significant number of the penalties.¶ Iran remains "entrenched in its nuclear weapons ambition," said Menendez, whose proposals to mandate punitive U.S. steps against Iran's foreign business partners have at times placed him at odds with the Obama administration.¶ A drop-off in Iranian oil sales and a rapid decline in the value of the nation's currency demonstrate "the impact" of the penalties, Kerry said when asked if he would be devote himself "to the full enforcement" of congressionally established sanctions and their implementation abroad if confirmed to lead the State Department.¶ "Congress deserves credit, together with the administration, for having put the toughest sanctions and the biggest coalition together in history," the Democratic senator from Massachusetts added in his appearance before the panel he usually leads.¶ After President Obama tapped Kerry for the top position at State and a vocal critic of unilateral sanctions to head the Defense Department, issue experts speculated that his second administration could prove more willing to curb sanctions against Iran as part of a potential compromise to end the nuclear standoff. Iran last year joined three rounds of high-level nuclear negotiations with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.¶ The United States would press Iran to fully comply with its obligations to the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency under any deal, Kerry said. The 15-nation U.N. body has pressed Tehran in four sanctions resolutions to cease uranium enrichment, a process capable of generating civilian reactor fuel as well as nuclear-weapon material. Iran has for years ruled out such a move and demanded international acknowledgement of its right to refine the material as an initial concession in a potential agreement.¶ "The president has made it clear that he is prepared to engage, if that's what it takes, in bilateral efforts," Kerry said, adding there is "hopefully ... a negotiation going on right now for the next meeting of the P-5+1."¶ "It is not hard to prove a peaceful program," he said. "Other nations have done that and do it every day. And it takes intrusive inspections. It takes living up to publicly arrived-at standards. Everybody understands what they are."¶ Speaking earlier, Kerry reaffirmed President Obama's assurance that the United States "will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon" and would not focus its strategy on deterring aggression by the Persian Gulf regional power should it acquire atomic arms.¶ "I repeat here today: our policy is not containment. It is prevention and the clock is ticking on our efforts to secure responsible compliance," he said in prepared testimony.

#### Talks are key to solve but are fragile now. This means that the aff can’t solve.

The Frontier Post 3/25 [“US-Iran Dialogue,” <http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/1099/>]

As different countries draw up different versions of analytical balance sheets on the rationale, utility and impact of Iraq war 10 years after the US-led invasion, Washington’s current approach towards Tehran indicates caution against another misadventure of the $2-trillion kind. This has been partly evident in the emphasis on dialogue over war since Barack Obama took charge in Washington four years ago. But it became progressively pronounced when negotiators from Iran and P5-plus-1 powers emerged from their talks in Kazakhstan in a mood that has rarely been portrayed in the vexed nuclear talks: optimism. While there was no breakthrough during the February talks, the fact that both sides acknowledged an improved negotiating atmosphere, where they were willing to meet again and hinted at softened bargaining positions on the nuclear issue, was itself a minor breakthrough. Beyond the technical details, some of the following factors may be influencing this changed attitude. One, the biggest prospective US foreign policy implication of Obama’s election and re-election has been and will be the likelihood of progress in the talks with Iran. Though Washington still claims that “all options” are on the table, Obama signalled his determination to give dialogue an improved chance by bringing on board John Kerry as Secretary of State and Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defence, both known to prefer talks over force. Perhaps Obama realizes that any realistic chance of him leaving behind a legacy is in the foreign policy arena, not in domestic economic revival. Kerry’s and Hagel’s appointments indicate Obama’s willingness to create more political space for his foreign policies than there was during his first term. Reiterating his preference and setting the tone for his visit to Israel a few days ago, Obama stressed that diplomacy will yield a more lasting solution to the dispute that will serve the interests of Iran, the United States, and Israel. Two, and more crucially, there is an understanding across the board that during the decade of Western pressure on Iran, it has actually expanded its nuclear programme significantly. Since Tehran has shown no sign of relenting, many suggest that not meeting Iran’s minimum conditions would prolong the stalemate, even leading to dire consequences. As a result, Washington may be open to a more nuanced approach. It is now also being understood and suggested that the best way forward is for both sides to realize that the evolving uncertainties after the Arab uprisings have opened an opportunity to seek common interests, without heeding mutual perceptions that the other is weakening. Three, the US logic was that it will go to war if sanctions do not make Iran bend to its terms. Washington now seems to be conveying that sanctions have actually worked — by pointing to the currency crisis and internal political divisions in Iran — thereby enticing Tehran for talks. Four, Iran, for its part, perceives that it has frustrated the West enough by withstanding sanctions and making significant progress in its nuclear programme, forcing it therefore to yield and pursue talks. Irrespective of which of these is right, the truth is that since Obama’s election, Washington has explored dialogue; and since Obama’s re-election, Iran has signalled that it is prepared to negotiate with the United States, unlike its stance since 2009. Five, there is a realisation in the West that any new regime emerging from a war against Iran may not necessarily be friendly with the west — a reality it witnessed in Iraq and now faces in the post-Arab uprising governments. Six, Iran will elect a new president in June. By willing to negotiate, Washington may be influencing the polls in favour of a moderate leader, rather than letting the war rhetoric radicalise the population into voting for another Mahmoud Ahmadinejad kind of hardliner or worse. Seven, Iran too has cooled rhetoric, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei directing the negotiations of recent times by remote control. Khamenei appears to have also realized that only progress in talks would yield a president unlike Ahmadinejad, who attempted to alter the domestic balance of power. Overall, the realisation is that status quo is unacceptable and that one must move away from zero-sum politics. Thus, irrespective of whether talks progress in the next few rounds or not, how long they take if they move ahead, or how far the feud will deteriorate before improving or vice versa, it seems that the only way out of the impasse is dialogue and not war, and it could well turn out this way. This possible scenario should encourage the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to begin considering alternative scenarios to protect their long-term concerns and interests.

#### Diplomatic talks are key to solve.

**Serwer 1-2-13** (Daniel, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/03/will-this-be-the-year-that-israel-goes-to-war-with-iran/)

Two big political uncertainties loom over the nuclear issue next year: Iran is scheduled to hold presidential elections in June and the Supreme Leader is thought to be ill. The identity of neither Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s successor as president nor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s as Supreme Leader is clear. While it may be too much to hope that the successors will be any better than the incumbents, any transition introduces diplomatic delays and uncertainties, even though the nuclear program should be expected to proceed. But will the transitions be orderly, or will the Greens who roiled Iran’s political sphere last time around revive? Iran’s regime has deep roots in revolutionary fervor, which has made it more resilient than Egypt’s. But that does not mean it will last forever.¶ There is still a slim hope for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The prospects are not good, but the consequences of failure are dreadful. The Obama Administration has managed to avoid overt commentary on Iran in the last couple of months. Candidate Romney was cautious during the campaign. The door is clearly open to the Iranians, if they want to come in from the cold of sanctions and isolation. If they fail to do so, and continue to buck the international community, war in 2013 is likely. Not because it is a good solution, but because President Obama might regard it as the only solution, albeit a temporary and highly uncertain one.